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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
by
Charles P. Bubany*
D URING the past year, the workload of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, which has been described as the heaviest of any state appel-
late court,' consisted primarily of cases in which the significant issues were
procedural. The United States Supreme Court also rendered a number of
decisions that will have an impact on Texas criminal procedure. Many of
the questions considered by both courts were controversial, often dividing
their respective members, but probably no decision from either court could
fairly be labeled "landmark." However, some commentators have suggested
that current decisions as a group manifest a retreat from the changes initiated
by the Supreme Court in the "Criminal Law Revolution" of the 60's and early
70's and signal the beginning of a counter-revolution in criminal law admini-
stration.
2
I. SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW: WAIVER AND HARMLESS ERROR
The extent to which technical violations of the rules will constitute rever-
sible error on appeal will be of as much practical importance to the lawyer
as the rules themselves. Two concepts that are fundamental in defining the
scope of appellate review are waiver and harmless error, which are concep-
tually distinct but related in terms of their practical impact. The concept
of waiver in criminal cases is inconsistent, changing its meaning according to
* B.A., St. Ambrose College; J.D., Washington University (St. Louis). Associate
Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
1. Phillips v. State, 511 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), citing Todd, Ap-
pellate Delay in the Criminal Courts of Texas, 37 TEx. B.J. 454 (1974). The crushing
workload of the appellate courts has made judges acutely aware of the need for judicial
economy. Judges on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals obviously feel the pressure,
often expressing impatience, and even irritation, with activity felt to be needlessly time-
consuming. See, e.g., Posey v. State, 515 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
(Morrison, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("majority's effort represents a
needless exercise which defies the concept of judicial economy"); Hawkins v. State, 515
S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("procedure adopted
by the majority amounts to judicial wheel spinning" and is "useless"). Delay and inef-
ficiency have been labelled as the major defects of the American criminal justice system.
See Burger, Paradoxes in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 428 (1967). However, the fear has been expressed that the push for administra-
tive efficiency and speeding up the process may have serious adverse effects on the sys-
tem. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Dash,
Preface to The United States Court of Appeals: 1971-1972 Term-Criminal Law and
Procedure, 61 GEO. L.J. 275, 280 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Gangi, The Supreme Court, Confessions, and the Counter Revolution
in Criminal Justice, 58 JUDICATURE 68 (1974). However they are characterized, current
appellate decisions evidence a shift away from concern with individual protections of the
accused at the formal stages of the criminal process to an emphasis on the overall reli-
ability and fairness of the proceedings to determine his guilt.
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the context in which it is applied.8 For appellate review purposes it means
that, except for fundamental errors, claims of error not properly raised in the
trial court nor preserved on appeal are "waived" and need not be considered
by the reviewing court. 4  Harmless error, however, is a determination that
an error, even if established after consideration by the court, is not substan-
tial or prejudicial enough to warrant reversal. 5 Some types of error are
necessarily fundamental and may never be harmless, nor will they be held
to have been waived by failure properly to object. These are errors which
relate to the power of the state to prosecute the defendant, such as lack of
jurisdiction, double jeopardy, or substantive defects in the indictment.6 How-
ever, even errors of constitutional dimension may be either waived7 or con-
sidered harmless8 if they are found not to have deprived the defendant of
a fair trial.
A case illustrating the application of both concepts is Gibson v. State.9
The defendant objected on hearsay grounds to a police officer's testimony
concerning a conversation that he had with the defendant's wife in the
presence of the defendant at the time of his arrest. On appeal, the defendant
argued that admission of the conversation into evidence violated the testi-
monial privilege of spouses granted in the Code of Criminal Procedure' ° and
his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
The court held that the claimed violation of the testimonial privilege was not
fundamental error and had been waived by counsel's failure to object on that
3. See generally Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet on the Citadel,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1970). With reference -to certain constitutional rights, waiver
means an actual, knowing and intentional relinquishment, which may not be implied.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4. TEx. CODE CruM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09(13) (1966) provides that the court of
criminal appeals shall review "any unassigned error which in the opinion of the Court
of Criminal Appeals should be reviewed in the interest of justice." As to claimed error
in the trial judge's charge to the jury, the failure of the defendant to properly preserve
his objections to the charges as required in id. arts. 36.14-.18 will preclude reversal "un-
less the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant,
or unless it appears from the record that ,the defendant has not had a fair and impartial
trial." Id. art. 36.19.
5. See Kotteakos v. 'United States, 328 'U.S. 750 (1946). With reference to non-
constitutional errors, harmless error is the rough opposite of fundamental error, that is,
an error that is not calculated to injure the rights of the appellant to the extent that
he has not had a fair and impartial trial. See Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458, 463
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974). For a constitutional error to be harmless, however, the court
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed
to the verdict in any significant way. See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371
(1972); Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
6. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (guilty plea did not waive claim that
"went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the
charge brought against him"); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975) (overruling Ex parte Roberts, 502 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), to the
extent that it held a guilty plea waived a fatal defect in an indictment). In addition,
violation of mandatory and absolute prohibitions of the Code of Criminal 'Procedure
may not be waived. Ballard v. State, 519 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Pizzalato v. State, 513 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ex parte
Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
8. See, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 513 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Bridger v.
State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
9. 516 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
10. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.11 (Supp. 1974).
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specific ground at trial."1 In fact, it was not error at all because the statu-
tory privilege of spouses would not apply to out-of-court statements made by
the wife to which she did not testify in court. 12  The fifth amendment claim
that tacit acquiescence in the statement was used to incriminate by silence
after arrest was also held waived, and additionally, even if it were error, it
was harmless because the evidence did not significantly enhance the
prosecutor's other evidence of guilt.' 3
The firm entrenchment of the rule that the grounds for an objection must
be unambiguously identified at the trial level creates a problem for defense
counsel in the rushed and often harried atmosphere of a criminal trial. 14
Another aspect of the waiver doctrine that warrants caution by defense
attorneys is the possibility of implied waiver by action during the trial which
is inconsistent with a properly raised objection. The scope of implied waiver
was at issue in Alvarez v. State" in which the court determined that the
defendant's attempted explanation of an admission to an extraneous offense
of homicide did not amount to a waiver of his objection to the statement
nor did it render harmless the error in admitting it into evidence.' 6 The
defendant's testimony did not constitute a waiver of his objection because of
"the long standing rule that an accused may offer evidence to rebut, destroy
or explain improper evidence without waiving his objection,"' 7 particularly
when he would not have testified but for the admission of the evidence. Ad-
mittedly, the standards are not easily applied, but the court held that were
it not for such a rule, it would be possible "to whipsaw an accused into a
position where he must acquiesce in the admission of the improper evidence
or waive the error of its admission when he seeks to combat it."' s
In his dissenting opinion Judge Douglas asked why the waiver rule applied
in hundreds of cases was not so applied in Alvarez. Under this rule the court
has routinely held that voluntary testimony presented by the defendant con-
cerning objected-to evidence waived his objection.19 Nicholas v. State20
apparently provides the answer to this question. There the rape defendant
objected on constitutional grounds to the state's admission of photo negatives
11. 516 S.W.2d at 409.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 410. For a discussion of the constitutionality of using a defendant's si-
lence as evidence, see cases cited in note 174 infra.
14. The Code requires the court to review a ground of error in the defendant's brief
if it "can identify and understand such point of objection... notwithstanding any gen-
erality, vagueness or any other technical defect that may exist in the language employed
to set forth such ground of error." TEx. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 40.0 9, § 9 (Supp.
1974). The court has not interpreted this section liberally. See Vela v. State, 5.16
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Phillips v. State, 511 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974) (note especially the authorities cited id. at 26). See also Ballard v. State, 519
S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (objection specific enough on rehearing after a
reading of the record as a whole).
15. 511 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
16. Id. at 498-99 (opinion of Onion, P.J., on second motion for rehearing). The
general rule is that admission of improper evidence will not require reversal if the same
facts are proved by other evidence not objected to, including defendant's testimony. Id.
17. Id. at 500.
18. Id. at 499-500.
19. Id. at 500 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20. 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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taken from his apartment. Later, however, the defendant called a witness
to establish by use of one of the negatives that no penetration had occurred.
The opinion on the state's motion for rehearing by Judge Odom, holding that
the defense testimony did not constitute a waiver of the objection, renders
inaccurate the broad language of other opinions which implied that mere
reference to the objected-to testimony by the defendant would automatically
result in waiver. Further the court held that the waiver-harmless error rule
is applicable when the un-objected to other evidence is of substantially the
same facts, but is not applicable to mere introduction of some evidence on
the same subject or mere use of the same evidence for rebuttal purposes. 2'
In other words, the court made a distinction between adoption of the
objected-to evidence, which is inconsistent with an objection to its admission,
and mere use as a predicate for an attack on its value, which is not. Thus,
in Warren v. State,22 where the defendant complained of a search that yielded
stolen tires from his storeroom, his testimony and that of another defense wit-
ness concerning the presence of the tires rendered harmless any error in the
admission of the tires because the purpose of the testimony was merely to
establish defendant's lack of knowledge that the tires were stolen, rather than
to attack or controvert the admitted fact of possession. 23
Voluntary admissions by a defendant at the punishment hearing concern-
ing evidence offered at trial will preclude questioning the admissibility of that
evidence on appeal.24  Apparently, the rationale of the rule is that even if
the admission of the evidence at trial was reversible error, defendant's testi-
mony could be used in lieu thereof on retrial. Thus, notwithstanding the
pressure on a defendant who has been found guilty to attempt to mitigate
his punishment by acknowledging guilt and explaining the circumstances of
the offense, it is only at the stage where guilt or innocence is determined that
he may attempt to controvert or explain the evidence without voluntarily
waiving his objection to it.25
The waiver and harmless error doctrines respond to the need for judicial
economy by avoiding the useless process of reversing convictions because of
merely technical errors. In addition, the waiver doctrine promotes the sound
policy of enabling the court to make informed decisions on fully developed
records. But both devices should be applied with care. Because determina-
tion of harmless error, waiver, and fundamental error necessarily involves
subjective judgments, application of the concepts depends to a large degree
21. Id. at 174-75.
22. 5.14 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
23. Id. at 464.
24. Stein v. State, 514 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Downey v. State, 505
S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
25. This dilemma for defense counsel is created by the lack of a procedure for inter-
locutory appeal of contested issues relating to the admissibility of evidence. Because ap-
peals take time and the likelihood of reversal is slim, counsel may not want to risk the
possibility of incurring a heavy sentence because of the defendant's failure to admit the
crime and ,to appear repentant at the punishment stage of the trial. Disclaimer by coun-
sel of an intent to waive the objection will be insufficient in itself because "a mere reci-
tation to this effect is not a talisman which invariably prevents an accused from waiving
error .... ." Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
1975]
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on the prevailing attitude of the judges. Judges are naturally and justifiably
reluctant to reverse convictions on appeal, particularly when evidence of guilt
is clear. However, the "presumption of guilt" on appeal and the desire for
increased efficiency in the criminal process have combined, according to at
least one eminent jurist, to create a "guilty anyway" syndrome in appellate
courts.2 6  Arguably, such an attitude has contributed to an unwarranted
expansion of the waiver and harmless error doctrines. In any event, the in-
creasing reliance on them reflects an apparent trend in appellate decisions
toward emphasis on the reliability of convictions rather than on the manner
in which they are obtained. 27
II. INVESTIGATION
Constitutional and statutory limitations on police investigatory techniques
are implemented through the rule which mandates the exclusion of unlawfully
obtained evidence at the trial of -the accused. 28 Growing disenchantment with
the exclusionary rule, particularly as applied to fourth amendment violations,
has contributed to a tendency to resist expansion of its scope and to limit its
effect.29 In addition, a number of authorities, including the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, have gone so far as to urge abandonment or
substantial modification of the rule.30 Whatever the ultimate fate of the exclu-
sionary rule, the growing willingness of the courts to question the rationale of
its strict application, particularly in cases in which the reliability and probative
force of the allegedly inadmissible evidence is clear, has increased the uncer-
tainty in an area of the law that was already "something less than a seamless
web."3
1
26. Bazelon, supra note 1, at 26.
27. See Zagel, Foreword to Supreme Court Review 1973, J. CuM. L.C. & P.S. 379,
392 (1974), in which the author states that Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973), discussed in Elliott, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 158-
61 (1974), "may signal a new emphasis on the pursuit of truth as the fundamental con-
cern of a constitutional system of criminal justice. If this is so, then we are about to
embark on another criminal law revolution."
28. The exclusionary rule is still the primary remedy for police violations of the
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (11886); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); the
sixth amendment right to counsel, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); and the
general due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 'Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952). As a rule of evidence, it is codified in Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
38.23 (1966).
29. Dissatisfaction with the rule is perhaps best indicated by the increasing popular-
ity of Justice Cardozo's wry observation that under the exclusionary rule "the criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). An express limitation of the rule occurred in United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), where the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule of Mapp does not apply to evidence presented to a grand jury. Decisions from the
state and lower federal courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court by finding
exceptions to per se rules of exclusion, primarily by the harmless error device. See
United States v. Acosta, 501 F.2d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1974) (Gee, J., dissenting).
30. See Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J.
573 (1971).
31. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). See also LaFave, Search and
Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 255.
[Vol. 29
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A. Arrest, Searches, and Seizures
As usual, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided a large number
of cases challenging the admissibility of evidence claimed to be the product
of unlawful arrests or searches. Some of the questions considered were: (1)
What conduct is subject to constitutional limitations of the fourth amend-
ment? (2) Where the fourth amendment is applicable, what constitutes suf-
ficient evidence to support either the issuance of a warrant, a warrantless
arrest or search, or police intrusions not amounting to a full arrest or search?
and (3) What is the scope and application of exceptions to the general
warrant requirement for searches?
Fourth Amendment Activity. A sine qua non of a fourth amendment claim
is police conduct that amounts to a "search" or "seizure" either of the person
or property of the defendant to which the restrictions of the fourth amend-
ment apply. 2 In determining whether police conduct is subject to constitu-
tional and statutory standards of reasonableness, the courts employ the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" approach that had its inception in Katz
v. United States.33 Unless the defendant is found to have reasonably antici-
pated that the matters observed or things seized by the police would remain
private, or has not assumed the risk they would be made public, he cannot
claim a violation of a protected privacy interest.34 This apparently was the
thrust of the Texas court's holding in George v. State,35 in which a view by
the police of contraband (subsequently seized by warrant) through holes in
defendant's backyard fence was "not unreasonable under the circum-
stances."3 6  Although the court acknowledged that the police activity was a
limited investigation calculated "to determine if there were any witnesses or
contraband in plain view,"'37 the authorities it relied on to justify the view in-
dicate that the court thought it was not technically a search.3 8  Observation
32. Not all police activity is covered by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Willis
v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (seizure of abandoned property).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court held that attaching an electronic
"bug" to the outside of a public telephone booth violated the caller's privacy even though
it did not constitute a physical intrusion into any enclosure. Katz rejected a solely phy-
sical definition of "constitutionally protected area" in favor of a dividing line between
matter or places that the individual "knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home
or office" and those that "he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public." Id. at 351-52. A later sophistication of the Katz expectation of privacy
test is found in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), which represents the ma-jority view of the Supreme Court. In holding that statements of a defendant to a cohort
whom he mistakenly trusts with incriminating information are not constitutionally pro-
tected even when recorded by advance arrangement with the police, the plurality rejected
the defendant's subjective expectation as controlling. Id. at 751-52. Instead, only ex-
pectations that society recognizes as reasonable are protected. See also Cioffi v. United
States, 95 S. Ct. 195, 42 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Thrush v. State, 515 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
34. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 ('1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969).
35. 509 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 499 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Gil
v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Capuchino v. State, 389 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
without entry into premises may be a search,89 but the courts routinely up-
hold views obtained by officers standing on public property who look through
car windows 40 or open windows of dwellings4' under the "plain view" excep-
tion to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the fourth amend-
ment. Because the plain view doctrine applies to "objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view,"' 42
it has been argued that the observation of incriminating matter must be inad-
vertent and unplanned to be held a plain view.43
The observation of contraband through the fence in George could hardly
be called inadvertent. A more satisfactory conclusion is that the observation
by the police of a matter that others might normally make cannot be said to be
reasonably unanticipated and hence is not a search. A defendant may not
claim an expectation of privacy when he has assumed the risk that the in-
criminating matter will be open to the public. The plain view doctrine and
its inadvertence requirement would more appropriately apply to situations in
which there is in fact an intrusion into an area to which the defendant has
an expectation of privacy but the police have prior justification for being
there through a warrant or otherwise. 44 The inadvertence requirement may
then be seen as nothing more than a ban against the use of an initially justi-
fiable intrusion as a subterfuge for observations of incriminating matter that
otherwise could not have been obtained. Situations such as that in George
involve the more basic question of whether there was any intrusion at all for
fourth amendment purposes. 41
What appears to be an extravagant application of the plain view doctrine
occurred in Christian v. State.46  According to police testimony, an officer
observed through a window what appeared to be marijuana in an apartment
where officers had gone to contact occupants about a robbery of their resi-
dence. The officers left but later came back when they knew the occupants
had returned. At the door, one of the officers announced that they were
police, called the defendants by their names, and stated that they wanted to
39. See Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); J. ISRAEL & W.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 92 (1971).
40. Casarez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
41. Turner v. State, 499 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim App. 1973f) (looking into window
with no blinds or curtains is not a search).
42. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
43. The unanticipated discovery requirement was expressed by the plurality opinion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (probable
cause to stop and arrest occupants of auto where officers had plain view of TV set in
back seat); Skunda v. State, 508 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (plain view of
brown bag appearing to hold gun inside after stop of auto on probable cause).
45. In California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Supreme Court
held that the maintaining of records by a bank at the Government's direction did not
violate fourth amendment rights of the customers because there was no search or sei-
zure. However, the customer's reasonable expectation of privacy has been held to in-
clude the expectation that his records would be used for internal banking purposes only,
and hence the fourth amendment forbids law enforcement officials from obtaining them
simply on request without legal process. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238,
529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). See also United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d
751 (5th Cir. 1974) (defective grand jury subpoena not sufficient "legal process" for
Government access).
46. 504 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
[Vol. 29
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talk to them. When the defendants (armed with a hammer and hatchet
respectively) opened the door, both officers "from outside could see the nar-
cotics still on the table in plain view."'47  After entering and examining the
narcotics, the officers arrested the defendants and conducted a "further
search" of the apartment that uncovered more narcotics. On appeal of the
subsequent possession convictions of both occupants, the court rejected the
defendants' contention that the warrantless search and seizure of narcotics
was under the pretext that it had been left in open view.48  Because one
officer testified that the second trip to the apartment was to investigate the
robbery, the court reasoned that the officers were not relying on the "plain
view through the window on the first trip" but rather on the plain view of
the same narcotics on the second.49  The second observation justified an
arrest for a felony and a search and seizure incident to that arrest. 50
The police officer's testimony that the reason for returning to the apart-
ment was merely to investigate a robbery rather than to arrest for possession
of narcotics seems almost incredible. But cases like Christian pose a prob-
lem for the court. Because conduct of the police appears reasonable under
the circumstances and not motivated by bad faith, the court obviously is not
inclined to censure it. However, the activity ultimately must be justified, if
at all, by the specific criteria of reasonableness under the fourth amendment.
Had the police relied on the first view of the marijuana, the court probably
could not have justified the second intrusion without a warrant, but by elimi-
nating the first trip from consideration, it could.51 Christian appears to be
one of an increasing number of cases in which the court appears to be apply-
ing a general reasonableness standard to uphold a search, but must contrive
a rationale for its decision under specific fourth amendment rules, which it
did in this instance by seizing on the bootstrap testimony of the officers. 52
Probable Cause. The required quantum of evidence to justify arrests and
searches is the constitutional and statutory minimum of probable cause. In
47. Id. at 866.
48. Id. at 867.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Reliance on the first view as establishing grounds to arrest or search would have
required an explanation of the absence of a warrant. The "plain view" justification for
search cannot be used as a subterfuge for deliberately delaying an arrest for the ulterior
motive of viewing a particular place, or for maneuvering an arrestee into a position
where incriminating evidence can be found. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying
text. Plain view implies that the evidence was "blundered upon" or stumbled onto by
the police. See United States v. Hand, 497 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. Police perjury, or at least distortion of the facts, is not infrequent. See Sevilla,
The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN Dmio L. REv. 839 (1974); Grano,
A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the Possibility
of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 409 (1971). Police conduct may seem reason-
able in some situations, at least from the standpoint of the police, but it may not meet
per se rules derived from the general standard of reasonableness contained in the fourth
amendment. Accordingly, in many cases it appears that the police, with the aid of the
courts, strain to avoid rigid probable cause standards by fitting their actions into the
black-letter exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 511
S.W.2d 1 ,(Tex. Crim. App. 1974). When, as in Hampton, the trial court upholds the
police activity, the appellate court is constrained to find some basis in the record, how-




the case of arrests probable cause is reasonable grounds to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed
it.5s  For searches, probable cause requires that the items sought are
connected with criminal activities, and that they will be found in the place
to be searched.54 The quantum of evidence is the same for both arrests and
searches with or without warrant,5 5 but warrantless arrests and searches re-
quire the court to sift through the facts of each case rather than focusing on
the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the warrant.56
In Texas, an officer may arrest on probable cause without warrant for any
offense committed in his presence.5 7  However, a warrantless arrest for an
offense commited outside the officer's presence is limited to felony offenses
for which there is probable cause and a reasonable belief that the person to
be arrested is about to escape. 58 The Texas rule is unique, however, in
making an arrest warrant mandatory if it is practicable to get one. Although
the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for arrest warrants, it has
never held that an arrest without a warrant is unlawful because the warrant
could have been obtained.
When probable cause for either an arrest or search is not based on the
personal observation of a police officer, the information used to support the
probable cause determination must establish unreasonable grounds to believe
that the informant is a reliable or credible person, and that the information
was obtained in a reliable manner.5 9 Personal observation of the officer
making an arrest or search or applying for a warrant suffices because his
credibility may be tested, 0 as may be that of named citizens providing infor-
mation.6' Most of the problems occur when police action is sought to be
53. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01
(Supp. 1974), 14.02, .04 (1966).
54. United 'States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 18.01 (Supp. 1974).
55. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.03 (Supp. 1974) authorizes the issuance
of combination warrants which authorize both a search and an arrest. See Pecina v.
State, 516 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (arrest justified by combination warrant
notwithstanding officers' lack of knowledge that warrant authorized both search and ar-
rest).
56. The United States Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference for war-
rants. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89 (1964); J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 98-99. 'However, the use of form
affidavits for arrest and search warrants is a common practice which the Texas court
has criticized. See, e.g., Sessions v. State, 498 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). It
is a well-known fact that the issuance of warrants, whether on the basis of printed forms
or not, is often a perfunctory act by the magistrate that merely rubber-stamps the judg-
ment of the police or the prosecutor, contrary to the spirit underlying the Supreme
Court's preference for warrants.
57. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Supp. 1974).
58. Id. art. 14.04 (1966). Exigent circumstances which may dispense with the need
for an arrest warrant are illustrated in Hooper v. State, 516 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974).
59. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).
60. The police officer's credibility may be tested in court when warrantless activity
is challenged, and is thought to be assured by the oath requirement of a warrant affi-
davit.
61. See Thompson & Starkman, The Citizen Informant Doctrine, 64 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 163 (1973). Unlike the anonymous police informant, "there is no reason for
deeming the information self-serving or suspect and, therefore, a substantial basis for
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justified on the basis of information from unnamed persons whose credibility
cannot be directly tested or verified.
In Truitt v. State62 an anonymous telephone tip that defendant had left
Dallas fifteen minutes earlier and was enroute to Greenville with about ten
pounds of marijuana in his gold Firebird automobile was held insufficient to
justify an arrest and subsequent seizure of marijuana. Over a dissent by two
judges, the majority concluded that the corroboration of the details of the tip
at the scene served only to establish the likelihood that the information had
been gained in a reliable way. However, before the arrest and seizure took
place, the police had no information to indicate that the informant was reliable
and was being truthful. Thus, the court refused to hold that an anonymous
tip may be "self-corroborating."
The standard method of establishing informer reliability is the allegation
that the informer has given reliable information in the past.63 Of course,
alternative methods may be used, as held by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Harris,64 but confusion and dispute has arisen concerning just what
information will justify crediting the tips of unnamed first-time informants.
The Texas court has upheld affidavits which include statements to the effect
that the informant had no criminal record, enjoyed a favorable reputation
in the community or among his associates, and had continuous gainful em-
ployment. 65  Lack of criminal record by itself, however, is insufficient.66  In
United States v. Acosta67 the Fifth Circuit read Harris as holding that the
inability to establish the informant's reliability by an allegation of past correct
information or otherwise could be offset in the case of a tip based on allegedly
first-hand observation when three other factors existed together: the affiant's
own knowledge of the suspect's background, the informant's declaration
against penal interest, and the specificity of the information given. Consis-
tently with the Fifth Circuit's view, the Texas court held in Abercrombie v.
State68 that an admission by the unnamed informant against his penal interest
in a warrant affidavit for a marijuana search was insufficient in itself to
support a finding that he was credible. Nor will the credibility of an informer
or his information be established solely by the officer's knowledge of the bad
reputation of the suspect or his previous involvement in activities related to
the contemplated arrest or search. The officer's knowledge in Rushing v.
crediting the out-of-court statement exists by the mere fact that the information is fur-
nished by a [named] citizen." Id. at 167.
62. 505 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
63. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Morgan v. State, 516
S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (informant had given reliable information four
times in the past); Vera v. State, 499 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). However,
where the affidavit does not indicate that the reliable information came from the in-
former himself, it is insufficient. Ashmore v. State, 507 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974).
64. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
65. See Caldarera v. State, 504 S.W.2d 9-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and cases dis-
cussed therein.
66. Id.
67. 501 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. No. 48,334 (Tex. Crim. App., July 24, 1974).
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State69 that the defendant was on probation for a drug violation combined
with an unverified tip that marijuana had been seen in the possession of the
defendant and that he and a named companion were in a certain color and
make pickup truck was held not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The
court acknowledged that the credibility of information from a completely un-
known and untested informer was increased by knowledge of defendant's rep-
utation, but held that "it would be relevant as one element helping to produce
probable cause" if it "were bolstered by numerous other factors, such as were
present in Harris."70
Stop-and-Frisk. Seizure of weapons or evidence connected with criminal
activity is often sought to be justified on less than probable cause or without
a warrant under the "stop-and frisk" rationale of Terry v. Ohio71 and Adams
v. Williams.72 This-exception to the probable cause standard allows limited
on-the-street detentions for investigation based on "reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot" and permits limited protective searches of detained
persons whom the officer reasonably suspects are armed and dangerous. 73 In
Wood v. State74 a "pat-down" of a passenger in an automobile, which had
been stopped for a traffic violation, that yielded a roll of coins subsequently
used at his murder trial was upheld. The officer testified that the defendant,
who appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol and who could
produce no identification, was frisked after he was asked to get out of the
car. Because the officer said he could not see the defendant's belt under
his coat and because he felt that "it was a very dangerous time when a person
is alighting from the vehicle in any traffic situation at that time of night,"75
he was found to have had a reasonable belief that the passenger was armed
and dangerous. 76 Cases like Wood illustrate the "hydraulic pressure" on the
fourth amendment created by the stop-and-frisk exception to the probable
cause requirement. 77  The facts relied on were the passenger's slurred
speech, lack of identification, and the officer's inability to see his belt because
of his coat, but the court appears to rely heavily on the officer's testimony
that he felt such situations were always very dangerous.78  Under the Terry
stop-and-frisk rationale, the officer's subjective view that a danger exists sup-
69. 500 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
70. Id. at 672 (emphasis by the court). An officer is entitled to act on information
available to another requesting officer if the requesting officer has probable cause.
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (197,1); Turner v. State, 499 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973). When the state does not show that the information available to the re-
questing officer justified the police activity, the activity of the officer acting on request
cannot be upheld. Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
72. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
7.3. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
74. 515 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
75. Id. at 304.
76. Id. at 306.
77. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 161 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. In concurring, Judge Douglas noted that the dangerous nature of the situation
is common knowledge. He found Wood indistinguishable from Wilson v. State, 511
S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and concluded that "the fact that one officer says
it is a dangerous situation in one case and the officer in another case does not say so
should not be the difference between an affirmance and a reversal." 515 S.W.2d at 308.
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posedly is not controlling, and it seems questionable that on the facts in Wood
the average (or reasonable) police officer would have had any real fear of
danger to himself or others. Perhaps the result in Wood is based on an un-
expressed feeling that the officer's perception, of danger would be commonly
shared by officers on patrol alone. In Wilson v. State,79 for example, the
court refused to allow a movement by the automobile passenger toward the
area between the two front seats without more to justify an officer's search
of the front seat after the man was outside -the vehicle with the officer's part-
ner. In addition, the officer testified that he was not in fear of his life at the
time he conducted the search of -the car, and the defendant "was not sufficient-
ly close to his vehicle that he could have conceivably lunged for a weapon."80
The reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous may arise
immediately after the forced confrontation, justifying an immediate seizure
without a pat-down."' However, in Keah v. State8 2 the officer's reaching into
defendant's pocket to find and immediately remove a "large bulge" was im-
proper absent any testimony that the officer thought it was a weapon, that
the defendant was dangerous, or that the safety of the officers or others was
in danger. It is obvious that in stop-and-frisk cases, as in other search and
seizure situations, the testimony of the officer is critical.83  Obviously there
may be cases in which the officer's testimony as to his belief is patently un-
reasonable. However, the court's emphasis on the subjective belief of the
officer indicates that the propriety of these searches may wel depend in many
cases on how well coached the officer is before he testifies.8 4
Search Warrants. In addition to the short time limit for execution of search
warrants-three days under the Code,85 the information showing probable
cause for issuance of the warrant must be fresh as the passage of time in-
creases the likelihood of removal from the place to be searched. Hence, a
statement of the time when the facts giving rise to probable cause took place
ordinarily will be required." However, a split decision in Powell v. State 7
found acceptable an affidavit that provided only one date-the date when
the information was received by the affiant-and no indication of the date
the informant actually gathered the information. The reasoning of the
majority apparently is to be found in one statement: "It is not an unreason-
able deduction for the magistrate to ascertain the closeness of time sufficient
to conclude from this affidavit that probable cause did exist since the offense
was alleged to have been committed on the same day as the affiant had
79. 511 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
80. Id. at 533.
81. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
82. 508 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
83. See, e.g., Davidow, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law
28 Sw. L.J. 268, 269 n.10 (1974). See also note 52 supra.
84. For example, in Hampton v. State, 511 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the
state nearly lost a search case because it was not until cross-examination by the defense
attorney on the motion to suppress that the officer mentioned a traffic offense (driving
in two lanes) that was used by the court to uphold the stop of the searched vehicle.
85. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 18.06 (Supp. 1974).
86. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 109-11.
87. 505 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (heroin possession).
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spoken to his informer." 88 Judge Odom dissented on the ground that although
events related by the informant could have occurred on the date he gave the
information to the affiant, they could just as likely have occurred on any date
before.8 9 It appears that the only basis for the magistrate's conclusion is the
affiant's own conclusion that the offense was committed on the same day he
received the information. On the basis of the information provided, this
could have been based merely on an assumption made by the affiant.
The constitutional9" and Code requirement 91 that a search warrant describe
with particularity the person or place to be searched and the things to be
seized is not strictly applied. For example, a warrant describing the premises
to be searched as the residence occupied by a named person located at a
particular street address and "all other structures, vehicles and places on the
premises" is specific enough to justify the search of a U-haul trailer found
in the front yard.92  Moreover, a technical error in the description of the
house to be searched, such as an incorrect street number, is not fatal when
the full description of the premises is reasonably adequate to inform the of-
ficers of the location and the place to be searched.9 3 The name or descrip-
tion of the person in charge of the place to be searched is no longer required
under the Code. 94  Villegas v. State95 held that a description of the person
in charge of the premises as "one Latin American male known only as Pete"
was sufficient under the old requirement when the warrant and affidavit
alleged that the full name of the occupant was unknown. Other cases have
held that ethnic origin or surnames alone with no allegation that a given name
was unknown were insufficient. 96 These cases no doubt are still valid prece-
dent in cases of a warrant to search a person rather than a place under the
new Code provision.97
The traditional requirement that a search warrant describe the things to
be seized must be qualified by the "plain view" and "mere evidence" excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. Items not named in a warrant, including
"mere evidence" of a crime, discovered and seized during the execution of
the warrant are normally admitted under the "plain view" exception.98 In
Chambers v. State99 the court upheld the seizure of a shotgun, burned wallets,
88. Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 588 (Odom, J., dissenting).
90. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
91. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (Supp. 1974).
92. Pizzalato v. State, 513 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
9,3. Suzman v. State, 508 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). See also Tyra v.
State, 496 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
94. The former article 18.13 has been repealed and replaced by TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 18.04 (Supp. 1974).
95. 509 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
96. Brown v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 61, 124 S.W.2d 124 (1939); Manly v. State,
120 Tex. Crim. 212, 48 S.W.2d 256 (1932); Aguirre v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 519, 7
S.W.2d 76 (1928).
97. TEX. CODE GRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 18.04 (Supp. 1974) provides that "[a] search
warrant . . . shall be sufficient if it . . . name or describe, as near as may be, the per-
son, place, or thing to be searched ....
98. See notes 37-47 supra and accompanying text. Authority to seize "mere evi-
dence" is provided by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
99. 508 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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and a bloody blanket by officers investigating a double murder who had only
a search warrant for an illegal weapon. The court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,100 wherein the seizure of merely evi-
dentiary items in addition to fruits or instrumentalities of a crime was ap-
proved. The only limitation is that the officers reasonably believe that at
least some nexus exists between the items of evidence seized and the criminal
activity being investigated. 101 The basis for believing that the seized evi-
dence is reasonably related to the offense for which the warrant was issued
must be apparent from mere observation under the "plain view" exception
to the requirement of a warrant. 10 2 In other words, the officers may not
seize anything which might be evidence and later justify the seizure when
only by further examination are the items in fact revealed to be evidence
of a crime.
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement for Searches. A well-established
part of fourth amendment law is that a warrantless search is per se unreason-
able unless an emergency or exigent circumstances exist which make the ob-
taining of a warrant impracticable.10 3 The exigent circumstances escape
valve has spawned a rather large number of general classes of cases which
constitute exceptions to the warrant requirement. As a practical matter,
since most searches are conducted without warrants, the exceptions them-
selves have tended to become the rule.
Consent Searches. A well-established and frequently used exception to both
the probable cause and warrant requirements is consent to a police intrusion
by a person who has an interest in the premises searched or items seized.
The ultimate validity of consent to searches either by the defendant himself
or a third person is determined by the same test-whether the consent is
voluntary. 10 4 Although many courts had previously assumed that the validity
of consent to a search by the defendant against whom its fruits were used
was based on the concept of waiver,10 5 the Supreme Court in Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte'0 6 defined the test as one of voluntariness rather than "know-
ing and intelligent" waiver of the right not to be searched. The effect of
Schneckloth is to make the burden of proof on the state less onerous than
100. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
101. 508 S.W.2d at 352. See also Chase v. State, 508 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 71, 42 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1974), in which the Texas court
held that the Texas search warrant statutes do not preclude warrants for search and sei-
zure of merely evidentiary items.
102. Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
103. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); White v. State, No. 47,507 (Tex.
Crim. App., July 2, 1974); Stoddard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
104. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed in Davidow, supra
note 83, at 268-69.
105. Although language is to be found in Texas cases that a consent to search is a
"waiver" of the constitutional right to be free of a warrantless search, the prosecution
must show by "clear and convincing evidence that the consent was freely and voluntarily
given." Potts v. State, 500 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). See also Ribble
v. State, 503 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
106. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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when it must demonstrate waiver of constitutional rights.'07 To establish a
prima facie case of consent the state need not show knowledge of the right
to refuse, which now is merely a factor to be taken into account.' 08 Although
a denial of guilt might appear to be patently inconsistent with a finding of
consent to a search for incriminating matter, the court does not presume lack
of consent from such a denial.10 9 Nor is lack of consent presumed from cus-
tody or the fact that incriminating articles were easily located in the place
searched. 110 The defendant's objective acquiescence is sufficient. Where an
officer does inform the defendant of his right to refuse the search, but the
defendant nonetheless grants permission, his misguided notion that the fruits
of the search will not be used as evidence will not vitiate the consent."'
A consent form may be used by the police in anticipation of future
challenges to the allegedly permissive search as in Gentile v. United States." 2
There the defendant, who had been arrested for burglary and had admitted
that stolen articles were in his apartment, signed a consent form which
authorized the police "to take from my premises any property, any letters,
papers, material, or any other property or things which they desire as evi-
dence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases now under investigation."
In the ensuing search, the officers found, inter alia, a check that formed the
basis of a federal conviction for mail theft. Justice ,Douglas, dissenting from
the denial of certiorari to review the conviction,"13 expressed his feeling that
"procuring consent from persons in police custody should be viewed carefully
and critically."' "14 His reasons for requiring close scrutiny of "consent" forms
bears repeating:
By proceeding on the basis of a 'consent' form the police circumvent
three important protections of the warrant procedure. First, -they avoid
submitting to a magistrate's independent assessment of probable cause.
Second, they are spared the necessity of making a record, in the form
of an affidavit sworn to prior to the search, that guards against the possi-
bility that an ex post justification will be based upon what the search
turns up. Finally, to the extent the police use, as they did here, a boiler-
plate consent form, they are relieved of the particularity requirement of
the warrant."15
107. Decisions like Schneckloth indicate a fundamental shift in interpretation of the
fourth amendment. If the validity of consent searches is not based on waiver, then pre-
sumably the defendant is not waiving a fundamental constitutional right to privacy by
consenting to a search. He must be foregoing only a protection against unreasonable
searches, rather than a right not to be searched without a warrant.
108. 412 U.S. at 227.
109. See Potts v. State, 500 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
110. See also Ribble v. State, 503 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Silva v. State,
499 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). But see Truitt v. State, 505 S.W.2d 594, 598(Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (dissent-
ing opinion).
111. Potts v. State, 500 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
112. 493 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 979 (1974).
113. Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 982.
115. Id,
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On the question of the effectiveness against the defendant of a consent
to search by a third party, the Supreme Court concluded in United States
v. Matlock"i6 that "the consent of one who possesses common authority over
premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared. 1" 7  Accordingly, the Court upheld the
validity of a woman's consent to the search of a room in which she had been
living with the defendant. What "common authority" is has not been clearly
defined, but it is not to be determined by reference to property or agency
concepts. Third-party searches are justified by the expectation of priyacy-
assumption of risk test which determines whether, as to the defendant,
a technical search actually occurred." 8  The effectiveness of the third party
consent as to the defendant "is concomitant to the reduction in privacy one
expects when [use of] an area is shared with another." 119 The defendant
will be held to have assumed the risk of disclosure where there is a third
person with at least "equal control over and equal use of the premises being
searched"' 20 and possibly less. It is a fact question whether the consenting
party has the right to use and occupy a particular area to justify his consent
to a search of that area. 21
Searches Incident to Arrest. Emphasizing the language in Gustafson v.
Florida122 that a custodial arrest for a traffic violation justified "a full search
of petitioner's person incident to that lawful arrest,' 2 3 a majority of the court
in Wilson v. State 24 refused to hold that the fact of a traffic arrest alone
authorized a search of the immediate vicinity of the arrested person, namely,
the area around the driver's seat. This view of the search-incident-to-traffic
arrest exception is not shared by all jurisdictions, and arguably is inconsistent
with the arm's reach limitation of the holding in Chimel v. California.125
However, it could be justified as a means of preventing the use of traffic
arrests as a subterfuge for a search of the offender's automobile.126  The
apparent shift of the Supreme Court toward emphasis of the fact of custody
itself as the basis for the search incident to arrest exception, rather than on
the need to protect the officer or to prevent destruction of evidence, was fur-
ther indicated in United States v. Edwards.127 There the Supreme Court up-
held a seizure and examination of an arrestee's clothing ten hours after he
was taken into custody because the fact that would have justified an earlier
116. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
117. Id. at 171.
118. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731. (1969); see 'United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 171 n.7 (1974).
119. Lowery v. State, 499 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
120. Swift v. State, 509 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Morrison v. State, 508
S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
121. Morrison v. State, 508 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
1122. 414 U.S. 260 (1973), discussed in Davidow, supra note 83, at 276-77.
123. 414 U.S. at 266.
:124. 511 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
125. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
126. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
127. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
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search, namely his in-custody status, still existed when the later search oc-
curred.
Automobile Searches. Another foray by the Supreme Court into the auto
search problem, this time in Cardwell v. Lewis, 128 failed to clarify the "mov-
ing vehicle" or "existent circumstances" exception to the general warrant re-
quirement for searches. No clear-cut opinion on the merits emerged, but the
deep philosophical split among the members of the Court was revealed once
again. The four-justice plurality upheld the warrantless seizure of the ar-
rested defendant's car from a public parking lot and an examination the next
day for tire and exterior paint matchups. In the plurality opinion, Justice
Blackmun suggested that the paint scrapings and tire examination did not in
themselves amount to a search. However, because the auto itself had been
impounded before the detailed examination and testing, he also needed to
justify its warrantless seizure as well. He did so by concluding that exigent
circumstances existed which justified, under the Court's earlier holding in
Chambers v. Maroney,129 dispensation from the warrant requirement. The
circumstances were the likelihood that the car would be removed and its
value as evidence destroyed. Chambers v. Maroney had held that where an
immediate search of an automobile without a warrant would have been justi-
fied on the street because of the existence of probable cause and exigent cir-
cumstances, its immediate seizure and a delayed search at the stationhouse
was permissible. The exigent circumstances were provided in Chambers by
the car's mobility, but the Court bolstered its approval of the delayed search
as did Justice Blackmun in Cardwell by noting that an immediate search in
a dark parking lot in the middle of the night was impractical because of the
potential danger to the officers and the inability to conduct a careful search.
The dissenting opinion in Cardwell emphasized that in the earlier decisions
carving out the so-called automobile exception, exigent circumstances were
provided as in Chambers by "a moving automobile on the open road.'13 0
Referring to the plurality's exigencies as mystical, Justice Stewart thought the
police had ample time to obtain a warrant and that there was "no reasonable
likelihood that the [immobilized] automobile would or could be moved. .... ,1l
He suggested that the real basis of the plurality opinion was a dissatisfaction
with the exigent circumstances limitation, as indicated by its strong emphasis
on the unique nature of automobiles. Indeed, at least one other recent de-
cision of the Court concerning automobile searches, Cady v. Dombrowski,l1 2
came close to establishing a general standard of reasonableness for automobile
searches in which the practicability of obtaining a warrant is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, because the exigent circumstances exception still has super-
ficial vitality, the state courts must continue to deal with it.
128. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
129. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
130. 417 U.S. at 597 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 598.
132. 413 U.S. 266 (1973), noted in 35 U. PITr. L. REV. 712 (1974), authorizing
search as a protective measure.
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In Henson v. State three members of the Texas court concurred in a state-
ment that a warrantless search of an automobile trunk is authorized if suffi-
cient probable cause exists. 133  However, this statement is qualified by
White v. State"34 as applying only to vehicles stopped on the highway which,
because of their mobility, provide the exigencies that justify an immediate
search. The state still must show exigent circumstances that make the ob-
taining of a warrant impracticable when the automobile is already stopped
and is not on a highway. In White the defendant was arrested at the drive-
in window of a bank for passing forged checks and was told to move his car
out of the way of the entrance. While he was doing so, he was seen mak-
ing a hand movement toward the glove compartment and then toward the
seat as if attempting to stuff something between the seats. The defendant
was then taken to the police station by one police officer while another drove
his car there. The car was not searched until after an interrogation of from
thirty to forty-five minutes, during which the defendant refused to consent
to its search. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that four wrinkled
checks found stuffed between the fold-down console and the front seat were
improperly admitted at trial. Commissioner Green's opinion, approved by
all but Judge Douglas, found a total lack of any exigent circumstances which
made the obtaining of a warrant impracticable, because of "no showing in
the evidence of any reasonable likelihood that the automobile would be
moved." 35 The court might well reverse itself in this case by finding suffi-
cient exigencies under Chambers v. Maroney. The inherent mobility of the
automobile existed at the scene before the officers took it to the station and
would apparently have justified an immediate search even though the officers
chose not to do so. The propriety of the delayed search in Commissioner
Green's opinion appears to depend on whether a good reason to postpone
the search existed. 'In White, unlike Chambers, just as careful a search with
no greater hazards than a search at the station apparently could have been
conducted at the scene.
Other Exigent Circumstances. Acting on two calls concerning a burglary, the
police in Nichols v. State"36 were advised by a woman that a man had burg-
larized her home, attempted to rape her, and had stolen a pistol. The offi-
cers were also told by a man at the scene that he and his wife had seen a
man climbing through a window of another house. When the officers de-
manded entrance to that house, and received no answer, an officer went
through a window and found the defendant inside. During a subsequent full
search of the house to determine if other persons were present, an officer
found the gun earlier taken from the complaining witness. The court con-
133. 502 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), citing Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d
758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) as authority. Fry did not distinguish, as it should have,
"between probable cause to stop a moving vehicle and the exigencies which warrant im-
mediate search of a vehicle already stopped somewhere other than on a highway."
Davidow, supra note 83, at 275.
134. No. 47,507 (Tex. Crim. App., July 2, 1974).
135. Id. at 2.
136. 501 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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cluded that the search of the area beyond the immediate vicinity of the
arrestee was not prohibited by Chimel v. California.137 Noting its prior hold-
ing that Chimel prohibited only routine searches of the area beyond the
arrestee's reach, the court concluded that Chimel did not prohibit broader
searches of the premises by the police to protect themselves from possible
harm by other persons who might be present. The leading Supreme Court
case of Warden v. Hayden138 is not direct authority for the holding in Nichols
because the search of a house in ,that case was justified to find the defendant,
and before his capture to search for weapons or other means of resistance or
escape. In Nichols the search of the house took place after defendant's
arrest, but presumably a full search for protection of the officers is justifiable
even after an arrest if at least a reasonable possibility exists that accomplices
or others are present who might assist him.
The courts obviously do not want search and seizure law to be an obstacle
to performance by the officers of their duty of protection of the public. Ac-
cordi.ngly, a warrantless search by an officer needing to take immediate action
in the public safety, and not for the specific purpose of criminal investigation
is permissible.' 39 For example, an immediate warrantless search of a person
may be justified by a medical emergency such as in Perez v. State.' 40 There,
an officer was summoned by a hotel manager who had been unable to revive
an unconscious man lying in a toilet stall. The officer found a warm bottle
cap, a balloon and eyedropper on the floor next to the man and saw fresh
needle marks on his arm. The officer's search of the man's pockets that re-
vealed heroin was held justifiable by either probable cause or the exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine. Although the defendant was not technically arrested
until after the search, it probably was sufficiently contemporaneous to be
justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest.' 4 ' Probable cause for the
arrest was established by the observation of narcotics paraphernalia, -the fresh
needle mark, and defendant's unconscious state. However, the court stated
that even without probable cause a search to find identification, medical
history, or the names of relatives, friends, and physicians was proper under
-the emergency or exigent circumstances doctrine.' 42
The exigent circumstances cases present potential factual problems similar
to those encountered in many warrantless search cases as to the actual pur-
pose of the officer at the time he conducted the search. The possibility
always exists that the exigent circumstances may not have actually motivated
the officer's decision to search, but they are used as an after-the-fact, and
hence improper, justification for an otherwise impermissible search. How-
ever, even criminal investigatory activity by the police may not require search
warrants, at least when it is characterized as pursuant to their general duty of
137. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
138. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
139. See TEx. CODE CIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 2.13 (1966).
140. 514 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
141. Probable cause to search the person in possession of contraband cases would be
the same quantum of proof necessary for arrest.
142. 514 S.W.2d at 749.
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investigation at the scene of a crime. 143
B. Admissions and Confessions
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning the ad-
missibility of confessions reflect .a tendency, similar to that in the fourth
amendment cases, toward restriction of the scope of the exclusionary rule of
the fifth amendment. Most recently, the Court strongly indicated in
Michigan v. Tucker 44 that Miranda v. Arizona, 45 which established specific
guidelines for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, may be
modified and perhaps overruled. In Tucker the Court held that a witness's
testimony that was obtained through information given in a confession not
preceded by complete Miranda warnings did not violate the defendant's priv-
ilege, at least in the absence of a showing of involuntariness or bad faith by
the police. What is significant in Tucker is the majority's indication that the
warnings prescribed in Miranda are nothing more than prophylactic rules in
aid of the constitutional privilege rather than part of the privilege.' 46
Regardless of Miranda's ultimate fate, Tucker provides a basis for avoiding
a literal black-letter application of the warning requirement.' 47
The warning requirements of Miranda apply to station-house interrogations
where the potentiality for compulsion is clear. However, they also apply out-
side the police station to situations in which the person interrogated is "de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way,' 148 even short of a
formal arrest. In Ancira v. State149 the defendant was not formally arrested
but was questioned by the officers during a ride in a police car. The court
held that the questioning was custodial-type interrogation because it occurred
in a situation in which the "potential for compulsion existed" and after the
"focus of the investigation had finally centered on the defendant. ' 15°  The
test of custody apparently is objective and depends on whether the investiga-
tion had focused on the defendant or whether the reasonable person would
conclude that he was under arrest or otherwise not free to leave. In other
words, although both are relevant, neither the questioning officers' intent nor
143. Tocher v. State, 501 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
144. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
145. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
146. The Court stated that the Miranda rules established a set of "procedural safe-
guards" that "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974).
147. Arguably Miranda warnings should not be required in all cases, for example,
to an attorney specializing in criminal cases who is arrested for a crime. In any event,
it appears that a "reasonableness" approach is becoming standard in fifth amendment
law. In United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974), a question to an
arrested defendant whether he had weapons within reach was found not to be an inter-
rogation under Miranda because it was not an attempt to elicit evidence of a crime but
a bona fide and minimally offensive security measure consistent with the stop-and-frisk
rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
148. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 478 (1966).
149. 516 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).,
150. Id. at 926.
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the questioned person's belief will necessarily make the interrogation custo-
dial. 151
When a statement is elicited from the defendant in circumstances to which
Miranda is applicable, the state has a "heavy burden" to demonstrate a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the
accompanying right to counsel. 152 As a practical matter, when a court con-
siders the question of waiver, it makes the same kind of case-by-case analysis
of the facts as is made when the voluntariness of the statement itself is chal-
lenged or when consent to search is at issue. 1 3 Under this totality of cir-
cumstances test, the state usually is able to satisfy this heavy burden. In
Sweiberg v. State'5 4 the defendant refused to make any statement without
consulting an attorney, whereupon the officers stopped interrogating him.
However, after the defendant was urged to talk by a girl friend and a mili-
tary policeman, and was again given the Miranda warnings, he made a state-
ment which the court held was admissible. Thus, a request for an attorney
or reluctance to speak will not forever bar further interrogation, but at some
point the continued issuance of warnings could constitute coercion which
would make any purported waiver meaningless.' 55
Assuming a valid waiver, an officer's subsequent conduct may, however,
invalidate the confession under the due process clause. For example, in St.
Jules v. Beto'56 a federal district court held that a county officer's promise
to a burglary suspect that if he admitted a series of burglaries he would be
tried for only one of them amounted to coercion and required suppression
of the suspect's confession to a crime in a nearby city. However, mere ad-
monitions to the suspect, statements of the interrogating officer's opinion, or
assurances not amounting to a promise concerning ultimate disposition of the
charges may not amount to improper inducement. 157 In determining both
the existence of a waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of the sus-
pect's statement, the focal point of the inquiry is the suspect's subjective
state of mind, but the intensity of the police activity and its probable effect
on the average person may ultimately be the controlling factor. 158
151. See Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1972); cf. Wussow v. State, 507
S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
152. See, e.g., Sweiberg v. State, 511 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
153. See, e.g., Moreno v. State, 511 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Hughes
v. State, 506 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
154. 541 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
155. For other change-of-mind cases in which the admissibility of confessions were
upheld, see Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Mitchell v. State,
503 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in a renewed questioning case. See Michigan v. Mosely, 95 S. Ct.
801, 45 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1975) (No. 74-653).
156. 371 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
157. See United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Frazier, 434 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1970). In Barfield the Fifth Circuit held that state-
ments to the suspect that it would be in his best interest to tell the truth, and that other-
wise he might be left "holding the bag" did not make the subsequent confession involun-
tary. 507 F.2d at 55-56.
158. In the confession cases, the courts cannot ignore the likelihood that the defend-
ant's testimony concerning voluntariness-waiver will be self-serving. Hence, the defend-
ant will have difficulty establishing that his subjective intent was different from that of
an average person under the circumstances.
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Under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, out-of-court
oral statements made by the accused are inadmissible unless they lead to evi-
dence of guilt or are the "res gestae of the arrest or of the offense."' 59 The
rule apparently is based on an assumption that oral confessions not made in
court are inherently unreliable except when the circumstancess triggering
either of the exceptions provide independent corroboration.' 60  The res ges-
tae exception, which applies to statements that are a "natural and spontane-
ous outgrowth" of the traumatic event of a criminal offense or arrest,' 6 has
been the most troublesome. By definition res gestae could apply to state-
ments made by persons either before or after being placed in custody. When
applied to situations in which statements are made by defendant in custody
but before interrogation, the res gestae exception closely resembles the volun-
teered statement exception of Miranda.'62  An admission blurted out by a
person confronted or restrained by the police without prompting should be
admissible under Miranda because a prerequisite of its application, an inter-
rogation, is absent. The absence of interrogation should support a finding
that the statement also is admissible under the res gestae exception as being
spontaneous and the product of the trauma of either the offense or the arrest.
Considerable confusion has occurred concerning the relationship of the res
gestae exception to the constitutional limitations of Miranda in situations in
which statements are made by an accused after in-custody questioning has
begun. Contrary to most other courts, the Texas court will not necessarily
exclude all unwarned statements made by an accused simply because they
are made during an in-custody interrogation due to its interpretation of the
res gestae exception. Statements of an accused in apparent response to ques-
tioning may be held in Texas to be the result of a spontaneous reaction to
the stimulus of the arrest or the offense, rather than a desire or compulsion
to respond to the questioning. 163 The Texas court has repeatedly empha-
sized that the res gestae exception is "superior to, independent of, and not
limited by [other] rules" concerning the admissibility of out-of-court state-
ments of an accused.164  However, this past year a majority of the court in
Smith v. State'6' concluded that the res gestae exception could not be applied
in place of Miranda to make statements admissible that otherwise must be
suppressed because of a constitutional violation. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the accused's admission in Smith was found to be not res gestae
anyway because it was a "direct and responsive answer to in-custody inter-
rogation" not preceded by adequate warnings.' 6 6 Subsequent decisions of the
159. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 38.22(1)(a), (e)-(f) (Supp. 1974).
160. See Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d '190, 197-98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
161. See Smith v. State, 514 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
162. See Larkin, Confessions in Texas Revisited, 3 TEx. TECH L. REv. 55, 72-74
(1971).
163. See Miles v. State, 488 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), discussed in
Davidow, supra note 83, at 278. See also Smith v. State, 507 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (Morrison, J., dissenting).
164. Pilcher v. State, 503 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and cases cited
therein.
165. 507 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
166. Id. at 781.
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court indicate that the majority opinion in Smith should not be read as mak-
ing the res gestae exception irrelevant in situations to which Miranda is ap-
plicable.' 6 7  If Miranda is interpreted as requiring exclusion of only those
statements that are the product of in-custody interrogation, the res gestae
rule does not conflict with Miranda. Because the rule purports to allow only
those statements that are the product not of the interrogation but of other
factors, it could be justified in the context of in-custody interrogation as
nothing more than a local test of Miranda's applicability. 1 8
The court reaffirmed its position under the general rule of article 38.22169
that a confession not admissible under the statute on the issue of guilt is in-
admissible for any purpose, including impeachment of the testifying defend-
ant.170  However, an attempt by the defendant to use part of an inadmissible
statement to raise favorable inferences in his behalf may allow the state to
introduce the balance .of the statement under the Texas version of the old
"open door" doctrine. 17' For example, if a witness for the defendant were
to testify that the defendant told investigating officers he wanted to tell the
truth, it would not be error for the state to question the witness concerning
the defendant's version of the truth.' 7 2  The ban against the state's use of
the statement will not be extended to allow the defendant to create a false
or misleading impression by giving only a partial or one-sided account. 173
Using analogous reasoning, the Fifth Circuit has even held that a defendant's
silence after arrest may be admissible to refute the impression created by
his testimony at trial that he cooperated with the authorities.' 74  As yet, the
Texas court has not considered this question,175 but arguably the court's rea-
soning that its statutory rule on confessions prevents impeachment by other-
wise inadmissible confessions would be inapplicable to impeachment by
silence.
The Texas courts also have had occasion to apply other statutory rules re-
lating to out-of-court admissions of the defendant. In Ballard v. State the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Code's prohibition against ad-
mitting statements of an accused to a court-appointed psychiatrist on the issue
167. Hill v. State, 518 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Davis v. State, 516
S.W.2d 157, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
168. See Larkin, supra note 162. Of course, by looking beyond the objective fact
of apparent response to questioning, the court becomes involved in a virtually impossible
determination of what the actual motivation for the defendant's statement was.
169. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Supp. 1974).
170. See McBride v. State, 506 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Hugley v. State,
505 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
171. Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.24 (1966), applied in Roman v. State, 503
S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The common law version of the rule is discussed
in United States v. Paquet, 484 F.2d 20,8 (5th Cir. 1973).
172. Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The dissentingjudges in Patterson disagreed that the defendant's remarks could fairly be interpreted as
having broached the subject of his statement to the police so as to allow the prosecutor
to delve into its contents. Id. at 863-65 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
173. Roman v. State, 503 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
174. United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1975). See also United
States v. Quintana-Gomez, 488 F.2d .1246 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in an impeachment by silence case, United States v. Hale, 498 F.2d
1038 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 616, 42 L. 'Ed. 2d 639 (1974) ('No. 74-364).
175. See Gibson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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of guilt included their use to impeach the defendant's credibility. 176 Unlike
the Miranda rule, the statutory prohibition absolutely proscribes use of the
statements of the psychiatrist and hence cannot be waived. However, error
in admitting such statements could be harmless, for example, when the same
facts related in those statements are established by other admissible evi-
dence.' 77 In addition, several court of civil appeals decisions concluded that
the new Family Code confers on juveniles an absolute right to an attorney
during custodial interrogations, which cannot be waived without the presence
of an attorney.' 78
C. Lineups and Pretrial Identification
Defense counsel routinely contend that in-court identifications of the de-
fendant should be excluded because a pre-trial lineup or show-up procedure
was conducted in violation of either the defendant's right to counsel or his
due process protection against impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification
procedures. 79 However, the state almost as routinely is able to meet its bur-
den of establishing by clear and convincing evidence an independent source
for the in-court identification which serves to purge it of any possible taint
allegedly resulting from pre-trial impropriety.' 8 0 It may do so by demon-
strating such factors as the opportunity of the witness to observe the criminal
act, immediacy of the initial pre-trial identification to the observation of the
criminal act, conformity of a pre-lineup description to the actual appearance
of the suspect, and the certainty of the identification.' 8 ' The existence of
such factors will overcome the effect of admissions by the witness that the
pre-trial observations of the defendant in photos or a lineup greatly aided
the in-court identification. 8 2 However, an admission by a witness that the
in-court identification would not have been possible without an improper pre-
trial identification, as in Coleman v. State,18 will establish the necessary taint
or causal connection and require exclusion of the in-court identification.
176. 519 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Grim. App. 1975). See also Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d
814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
177. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
178. See In re S.E.B., 514 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, no writ); In
re F.J., 511 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); In re R.E.J., 511
S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
179. The fifth amendment applies only to testimonial disclosures and hence does not
apply to observations or physical tests of the defendant. Johnson v. United States, 228
U.S. 457, 458 (1913); Ward v. State, 505 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The
fourth amendment also is inapplicable to compelled exhibition of physical characteristics
not amounting to intrusions into the body. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (teethmark impression compellable), relying on Olson v. State,
484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (handwriting exemplars compellable), and its
extended discussion of the types of physical evidence that are within constitutional pro-
tections. See also Allen v. State, 511 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), holding
that TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc.'ANN. art. 38.23 (1966) is inapplicable to identifications
because "[b]y its own terms it applies to illegally obtained evidence."
180. Application of this rule to improper identification claims had its genesis in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
181. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218(1967); Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Pizzalato v. State,
513 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Waffer v. State, 500 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973); Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
182. See, e.g., Bedford v. State, 501 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
183. 505 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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Both the independent source and harmless error doctrines' 8 4 enable courts
in many cases to avoid the question of the propriety of the objected-to out-
of-court procedure. 'However, in Green v. State15 the court applied the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Ash'8 6 to hold that in Texas no
right to counsel attached to photographic displays. As to other pre-trial iden-
tifications, the court has apparently concluded that the right to counsel does
not arise until after the indictment or information has been filed.' s8 On a
number of occasions the court reiterated its condemnation of one-man show-
ups as being unnecessarily suggestive, 8 but only once did it hold that such
a pre-trial identification so irreparably tainted an in-court identification as
to violate due process. l8 9 A persuasive argument could be made that under
present law it is doubtful that jurors are adequately shielded from unreliable
identification testimony or adequately instructed concerning its potential
deficiencies.' 90
III. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
The proceedings at the pretrial phase of the criminal process have more
practical significance in the majority of cases than the trial itself. 191 The
most critical factor in the ultimate disposition of criminal charges is the discre-
tion of the prosecutor at the pre-trial stages. During the survey year the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rendered a number of decisions relating
to the formal limits on that discretion.
Indictment and Information. In American Plant Food Corp. v. State' 9 2 the
court provided a detailed discussion of the "subtle" but "well founded" dis-
184. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 509 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
185. 510 S.W.2d 9,19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
186. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
187. The Texas court apparently views the indictment or information as synonymous
with the formal charge that was held to initiate adversary criminal proceedings under
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Pizzalato v. State, 513 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974); Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Lane v. State,
506 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Ward v. State, 505 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974). In Pizzalato the defendant was placed in a line-up after an arrest on a
marijuana charge but before any robbery charges had been filed; apparently, as to the
robbery charge, the right to counsel had not attached. The court also attaches a per-
haps unwarranted significance to the execution of a formal waiver of right to counsel
at line-ups. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 505 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
188. See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Coleman
v. State, 505 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Davis v. State, 505 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974); Winn v. State, 503 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
189. Coleman v. State, 505 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
190. See generally Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safe-
guards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 719
(1974).
191. For example, post-arrest release of an accused normally is the first immediate
concern of a lawyer and his client. The standards for fixing bail, the right to which
is guaranteed in all but capital cases, TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (1966),
are contained in id. art. 17.115. The statute's prohibition of bail as "an instrument of
oppression" reflects the notion that the sole justification for requiring bail is to assure
the accused's presence at trial. See, e.g., Ex parte Ramirez, 156 Tex. Crim. 280, 241
S.W.2d 157 (1951). The fact that a defendant has skipped bail once before is a proper
consideration in setting bail. Ex parte Poindexter, 511 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974). However, an accused must be given an opportunity to present evidence relevant
to the bail determination. Ex parte Sellers, 516 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
192. 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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tinction in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure between substantive as
opposed to merely formal defects in indictments and informations. 193 The
importance of the distinction on appeal is that only substantive defects are
fundamental error and may be considered for the first time on appeal. The
failure to allege the constituent elements of the offense charged is a substan-
tive and fundamental defect that voids the conviction because the charging
document is insufficient to support a conviction.19 4  On the other hand, lack
of specificity, although relative to substance, is considered a matter of form
only that will be waived by failure to object at the trial level. 195
Joinder of Offenses and Former Jeopardy. In Texas a plea of former
jeopardy as a bar to prosecution includes two distinct claims: former con-
viction of the "same offense," and former acquittal of the "accusation.' 9 6
The scope of the former conviction bar is determined by the carving doctrine,
which limits the state to a single conviction for only one offense where the
offenses committed by the defendant are part of the "same transaction."'1 97
The limitation on the prosecution expressed in the carving doctrine is broader
than the apparently constitutional minimum "same evidence" test of the
"same offense" under the double jeopardy clause of the United States Con-
stitution.198 "Same evidence" is the test employed in Texas on the question
of whether a subsequent prosecution will ,be barred by a prior acquittal.19 9
Whether a prior conviction will bar a subsequent prosecution is determined
by the often difficult application of the "separate and distinct" test of same
transaction under the carving doctrine.20 0
Cases such as Lamberson v. State20 do not prove difficult. The defendant
had been convicted previously of robbery, but was convicted in a second
prosecution for murder of the victim in the robbery. The court had little
193. See TEx. CODE CMrM. PROC. ANN. arts. 27.08-.09 (1966).
.194. See note 6 supra. For examples of fatally defective charging documents, see
Besson v. State, 515 S.W.2d 1,12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (charge of willful fleeing and
attempt to elude police fatally defective because information did not allege signal to stop
or that vehicle was motor vehicle); Crockett v. State, 511 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974) (charge of possession of dangerous drug void because drug Talwin not within sta-
tutory definition).
195. American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Lincoln v. State, 508 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (the name in an in-
dictment may be amended). Duplicity is not a fundamental error and a duplicitous in-
dictment may be amended. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 508 S.W..2d 844 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974).
196. Former jeopardy is the only "special plea" in Texas. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoC.
ANN. art. 27.05 (Supp. 1974). The Texas doctrine of former jeopardy is summarized
in Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
197. The "carving doctrine" as a limitation on the power of the prosecutor to join
offenses in one prosecution is illustrated by Price v. State, 475 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Compare Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), in
which the Supreme Court refused to adopt a broad definition of "same offense," but in-
stead held the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable as a part of the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy prohibition. The doctrine estops the prosecution from relitigat-
ing issues necessarily decided for the defendant in his earlier prosecution. Cf. Pope v.
State, 509 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
199. See Warren v. State, 5,14 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 4974), wherein the
language "same act" is used synonymously with "same evidence."
200. See Waffer v. State, 504 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
201. 509 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
1975]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
difficulty concluding that the second prosecution was permissible because the
offenses were separate and distinct. They were committed in different places
and at different times, and they were not part of "one continuous assaultive
action tying the two crimes together. '20 2  More difficult are cases such as
Lee v. State,203 which is made even more difficult by the perhaps understand-
able reluctance of the majority to discuss how the facts support its finding
that three separate sodomy convictions were permissible. The three separate
indictments resulted from various sodomous acts presumably committed by
the defendant on one victim at the same location but on different parts of
the victim's body. The majority's conclusion that the three offenses were not
proven by the same acts or evidence would only be sufficient to dispose of
a contention that an acquittal of one offense would not necessarily preclude
prosecution for another. 20 4 Its conclusion that the offenses were separate and
distinct seems questionable under its previous decisions in which identity of
intent and victim, proximity in time and space, and continuity of the acts are
controlling, notwithstanding technical differences in the acts.20 5
Right to a Speedy Trial. The specific constitutional guarantee of speedy
trial under the sixth amendment 206 attaches after the defendant is held to
answer to a criminal charge either by way of indictment, information, or
formal arrest. 20 7  In determining whether a charge must be dismissed
because of a denial of a speedy trial, the court must balance four factors:
(1) length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion
of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay. 208 The most
difficult obstacle for a defendant claiming a denial of speedy trial, even in
cases of lengthy delay, has been the requirement of a showing of prejudice.
The Texas court has held that while actual prejudice need not be shown, the
defendant has the burden of showing at least a real possibility of prejudice
from the delay.209 In McCarty v. Heard210 the federal district court granted
202. Id. at 330. The fact that testimony concerning the murder was admissible in
the robbery trial under the res gestae rule was irrelevant because that rule is a rule of
evidence and does not determine whether two crimes are one single -transaction for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes. Id. In Jones v. State, 514 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
the court was relieved of the necessity of deciding whether the offenses of burglary with
intent to commit rape and the subsequent rape were separate and distinct because the
statutes explicitly authorized prosecutions for both.
203. 505 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
204. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Ex parte Calderon, 508 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (indecent
exposure, statutory rape, and fondling of same child on same date and at same time all
part of one transaction); cf. Crabb v. State, 503 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)(fleeing from police separate from speeding because court able to characterize them as
being at different times and on different stretches of same road).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
207. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). Pre-indictment or pre-arrest de-
lay may, however, violate due process if it prejudices the defendant's right to a fair trial
and is "an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused." Id. at 324.
The sole remedy for denial of speedy trial is dismissal of the charges with prejudice.
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
208. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972); Wilkerson v. State, 510 S.W.2d
589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. '1974); George v. State, 498 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973).
209. See McCarty v' State, 498 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Harris v. State,
489 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). In Archie v. State, 511 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.
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a petition for habeas corpus relief on an allegation of denial of speedy trial
that had been rejected by the Texas court.21' The district court held, con-
trary to the Texas court, that the inability to show prejudice was not neces-
sarily fatal to successful assertion of the claim. 212 Relying on the analysis
by Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit of the Barker test218 in Hoskins v. Wain-
wright,214 the court concluded that "there must be some point of coalescence
of the other three factors in a movant's favor, at which prejudice-either
actual or presumed-becomes totally irrelevant. ' 215 In such case, "a court
must intervene regardless of whether the defendant has been incarcerated,
subjected to public scorn or obloquy, or impaired in his ability to defend him-
self."'216 The "inexplicable delay" of thirty-one months "in the face of
vigorous demands for an immediate trial" was enough to uphold McCarty's
claim.
2 1 7
Incompetency To Stand Trial. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial
unless he "'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding'" and "'has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ",218 A minimum re-
quirement of due process is a separate inquiry into the incompetency or "pre-
sent sanity" of a defendant whom the trial court reasonably doubts is compe-
tent to stand trial. 219 Article 46.02 of the Code 220 -requires that this inquiry
be conducted by -a separate jury apart from the trial on the issue of guilt of -the
crime charged. 221  In 'Carpenter v. State22 2 the judge's decision to proceed
to trial on the merits when the jury was unable to agree on a verdict in the
competency hearing was held erroneous because of the lack of a final
determination as required by the Code. Of course, in a given case, the trial
judge could reverse his determination that a doubt as to present insanity
existed, and if that decision were correct, the need of a separate jury would
Crim. App. 1974), a delay of over three years was not fatal when defendant was out
on bail shortly after arrest and was unable to show any substantial interference with
his ability to defend himself or to assist his counsel at trial. However, the defendant
in Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d .122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), was able to show prej-
udice due to long delay during which alibi witness died.
210. 381 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
211. McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Crim. App. 197-3).
212. 3&1 F. Supp. at 1293.
213. See text accompanying note 208 supra.
214. 485 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973)
(per curiam).
215. 391 F. Supp. at 1293.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Wages v. State, 501 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), quoting from
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
219. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). A competency hearing also is
mandated by the federal law (18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970)) when a report of a court-ap-
pointed psychiatrist "indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency
in the accused" that he is "unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly
to assist in his own defense ...... United States v. Makris, 483 ,F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.
1973).
220. TEX. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02 (Supp. 1974).
221. Id. § 1. The statutory requirement is absolute. See Cavender v. State, 515
S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), and cases therein cited.
222. 507 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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be obviated. 223 However, in light of the strong evidence produced at the
trial alone in Carpenter, the failure to submit the issue for a separate jury's
determination would have been an abuse of discretion.
Whether -the trial court's failure to order a separate hearing on the
competency issue is an abuse of discretion can be a close question. In
Reeves v. State224 the defendant made a motion for a pre-trial competency
hearing based on the opinion in an attached unsworn statement of a privately-
obtained psychiatrist, but withdrew the motion after learning the opinion of
other experts. In holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
not impaneling a separate jury to determine the competency issue, the court
stated that the mere suggestion in a motion coupled with a request for
psychiatric examination was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
competency. 225 The court discounted the unsworn opinion of the psychiatrist
because it was dated three months before the trial, because the motion had
been withdrawn in the face of other opinion, and because no other evidence
of insanity or incompetency was presented at the trial itself. Moreover, the
defendant's behavior and testimony in a four-day trial at which he gave ex-
tensive, clear, and lucid testimony did not indicate incompetence. 226
Discovery. Despite the opinion of two judges that the "majority has set a
standard well-nigh impossible for many accused persons to meet, ' 227 the
Texas court continues to give a restrictive interpretation to the discovery
statute, article 39.14.228 As a result, whether a defendant has meaningful
discovery in fact may depend primarily on how strictly the trial judges and
prosecutors adhere to the statute. Under the statute, the defendant must
establish (1) good cause, (2) materiality, and (3) possession by the state
to require the prosecution to produce material for pre-trial inspection that is
not specifically exempt from discovery before trial. The court repeatedly has
upheld the trial court's refusal to grant discovery to a defendant because
defendant's motion was too broad. For example, in Thomas v. State a
motion for discovery of any papers, object, or real evidence in the possession
of the prosecutor which may in any way be material was held too unspecific
to require production of cigarette papers found in defendant's pocket when
he was arrested. 229 In his concurring opinion Judge Roberts noted that the
223. See Quintanilla v. State, 508 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
224. 516 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
225. See also Marroquin v. State, 511 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (motion
for psychiatric exam insufficient standing alone); King v. State, 511 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (bare allegation of incompetency in motion for medical exam);
Thibodeaux v. State, 505 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (only evidence was state-
ment made to the court after state had rested its case; no motion for hearing or requested
charge on insanity).
226. 516 S.W.2d at 413. See also Perryman v. State, 507 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974) (testimony coherent and no indication of incompetency); Quintanilla v.
State, 508 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
227. Thomas v. State, 511 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
228. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (1966); see Hoffman v. State, 514
S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
229. 511 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The court distinguished Detmering
v. State, 481 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), in which error was found in the trial
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"fishing expedition" objection to broad discovery motions effectively limits
discovery to "only those items of which [the defendant] is aware" and hence
gives "not discovery, but only a limited right of examination. '230
Even if the motion makes a specific request for something that the state
clearly has in its possession, the requirement of a showing of materiality poses
a dilemma for defense counsel. Without knowledge of what the prosecution
possesses, counsel may be unable to make even a colorable showing of
materiality of any items other than those on which the state intends to rely
at trial. Perhaps he may convince -the trial judge to make an in camera
inspection of the requested material,231 but a trial judge may unilaterally
decide that the material would not be useful or helpful to the defendant. On
appeal the question of materiality effectively becomes simply whether the
refusal to grant the request prejudiced the defendant or was harmless.
Although witness statements are specifically exempted from pre-trial dis-
covery as work product, under the court-fashioned Gaskin rule the defendant
must be given requested reports or prior statements made by a testifying wit-
ness. 232 Moreover, other evidence not discoverable before trial must be dis-
closed if it is used by a witness "before the jury. ' 233  In Hoffman v. State234
the court reemphasized the distinction between the Gaskin rule and the "use
before the jury" rule. The defendant has an absolute right of access to re-
ports or prior statements of a prosecution witness whether or not the witness
has used the statement or report to refresh his memory. 235 If the trial court
for some reason, however, does not require their production for use by the
defendant, it must append copies of the material to the record on appeal to
enable the appellate court to determine if failure to produce was reversible
error. In Jackson v. State236 the court held that failure to provide defend-
ant's counsel with the written police report made by a testifying officer shortly
after the arrest was prejudicial error. Although the report did not conflict
with the officer's testimony, reversal was warranted because of certain critical
evidence given by the officer in his testimony which was not in the report.237
The constitutional prohibition against the state's suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused does not require. pre-trial disclosure of exculpatory
evidence not otherwise discoverable under article 39.14, according to Payne
v. State.238  Payne's contention that the statutory requirement of adequate
time to prepare required earlier disclosure was rejected.239  However, by
court's refusal to allow defendant to make a chemical analysis of drugs in response to
his motion to discover " 'dangerous drugs ... which the State of Texas intends to intro-
duce into evidence in this case and which is now in the possession of the District Attor-
ney.'" Id. at 864.
230. Thomas v. State, 511 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
231. See Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
232. Gaskin v. State, 353 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
233. Id. at 469 (Woodley, J., on motion for rehearing).
234. 514 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
235. Id. at 253.
236. 506 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
237. Id. at 622.
238. 516 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
239. Id. at 677; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.04 (1966) (appointed de-
fense counsel has ten days to prepare).
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holding that the "opportunity to request a postponement or continuance...
adequately satisfies due process requirements"' 240 the court implicitly recog-
nized that some material and favorable evidence may be of little assistance
unless available in advance of trial. The Texas court obviously does not
intend to allow the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose to become a
means by which the defense may short-cut its own preparation. In White
v. State241 the court reversed its earlier opinion that the state's purposeful
conduct in procuring the absence of a material defense witness violated due
process, holding on rehearing that the defendant had failed to show sufficient
diligence to obtain the presence of the witness notwithstanding the state's
activity. 24z As suggested by the dissenting opinion and the original majority
opinion in White, however, instances of intentional or bad faith suppression
by the prosecutor should reduce the defendant's burden of establishing
diligence and specific prejudice.
IV. GUILTY PLEAS
The large number of cases involving attacks on guilty plea convictions
reflect the fact that a majority of criminal cases are "settled" by bargained
guilty pleas. The primary focus of the appellate cases has been on the ade-
quacy of the warnings to the defendant and the record made at the guilty
plea hearing under Code of Criminal Procedure article 26.13. Although the
article 26.13 definition of the duty of the trial court in taking a guilty plea
continued to cause dissension on the court,243 the "substantial compliance"
interpretation of the statutory duty finally prevailed. Under that interpreta-
tion the defendant must be specifically advised of the nature of the offense
and the consequences of his plea. 244 However, the trial judge's inquiry into
the voluntariness of the plea need not track the specific language of article
26.13 but need only be sufficient for the judge to conclude that the defend-
ant is mentally competent and that his plea is not the result of coercion or
improper influences. 245 A mere recital in the judgment that the required
inquiry took place, however, is not an adequate substitute for a personal in-
quiry by the judge into the voluntariness of the plea. 246
The trial judge in Texas is not required to advise the defendant of any
of the potential consequences of a judgment on a plea of guilty other than
240. Payne v. State, 516 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
241. 517 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
242. Id. at 550.
243. See, e.g., Bosworth v. State, 510 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). TEX.
CODE CRIM. Paoc. ANN. art. 26.13 (Supp. 1974) provides: "If the defendant pleads
guilty, or enters a plea of nolo contendere, he shall be admonished by the court of the
consequences; and neither of such pleas shall be received unless it plainly appears that
he is mentally competent, and is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by any
persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt."
244. Reading the indictment is sufficient to advise the defendant of the nature of
the charges. Logan v. State, 506 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
245. See, e.g., Bosworth v. State, 510 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Curren
v. State, 509 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
246. Toombs v. State, 514 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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the potential punishment. 247 ,In Alvarez v. State248 the court reversed a con-
viction of possession of heroin entered on a guilty plea because the defendant
was incorrectly admonished under article 26.13 that the maximum penalty
he could receive was twenty years when it was actually life imprisonment.
The two dissenting judges, noting that the question had divided the court
before, viewed the error as harmless because the obvious purpose of article
26.13 was to avoid misleading a defendant to plead guilty where he could
receive a greater punishment than he thought possible. Here he did not
receive a greater sentence than the maximum advised and, therefore, was not
misled to his prejudice.249
Post-conviction attacks on guilty plea convictions often are based on claims
that a bargain on which the plea was based was broken. Because the details
of pre-plea bargaining need not be disclosed at Texas guilty plea hearings,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals normally has a scanty record on which
to resolve broken bargain claims. This problem led the 'Fifth Circuit in
Bryan v. United States250 to mandate an early implementation of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requiring that all plea arrangements and
negotiations be disclosed at the hearing on the guilty plea. The Texas pro-
cedure, however, discourages an inquiry by the trial judge into the expecta-
tions of the person pleading guilty and in fact creates pressure on the defend-
ant to pretend that no bargaining has taken place. On appeal the defendant
will have a heavy burden to establish that any bargain was made by the
prosecutor in the face of his statement to the contrary in the recorded
colloquy below.251 Even if the appellate court acknowledges that a bargain
was struck, it will not invalidate the plea merely on the basis of alleged mis-
understandings or subjective expectations of the bargaining defendant as to
the effect of any prior agreement. For example, in Valdez v. State2 52 the
defendant claimed his plea was involuntary because he thought he was going
to get probation pursuant to the recommendation of the prosecutor. Despite
the prosecuting attorney's recommendation of probation on the charge of
statutory rape, the defendant had been given a five-year sentence without
probation. The court found the "warnings and admonitions to be in sub-
stantial compliance with Art. 26.13" and that the defendant had pleaded
guilty because he was in fact guilty.258  The court stated that "[t]he fact
that appellant may have plead guilty as a result of plea bargaining in the
hope of escaping the possibility of a higher sentence did not invalidate the
plea. '254 A different question would have been presented had there been
247. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 457 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (failure
to advise that sentences could run consecutively not error). See also LeBlanc v. Hender-
son, 478 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (need not advise
of ineligibility for probation or parole).
248. 511 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
249. Id. at 523.
250. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
251. See Rodriquez v. State, 509 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Miles v. State,
501 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
252. 507 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).




any evidence that the defendant was led to believe that the court was in any
way bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. 25 5 Although reference to
prior bargaining need not be made, the judge should advise the defendant
that the court is not bound by any agreements between the prosecution and
the defense. Further, the court should advice the defendant that he will
be permitted to withdraw his plea if the court's decision as to disposition does
not conform to his understanding of the terms of the agreement.
V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel assumes effective assist-
ance of counsel, but whether the court will find inadequacy depends on
whether counsel is retained or appointed. The court of criminal appeals has
determined that inadequacy of retained counsel is not attributable to the
state.256 Presumably, however, even retained counsel's performance could
be so defective as to result in a "fundamentally unfair" trial or could be error
if the trial court could have taken action to correct it.
Mirroring the current concern over the standard of performance of defense
counsel in criminal cases, the court in Ex parte Gallegos257 clearly established
the "reasonably effective assistance" standard as the test of constitutionally
satisfactory representation by counsel. In so doing it conformed the state law
to the standard that had been applied by the Fifth Circuit in reviewing state
convictions. 25s Under the new standard the court found that counsel's failure
to provide the defendant with a rudimentary explanation of the elements of
the crime charged before entry of a guilty plea constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. Later in Ex parte Bratchett259 another guilty plea was
struck down because appointed counsel conducted no investigation of the
case.
The standard for determination of indigency which requires state-paid
counsel and other assistance is not definitely stated in the law and necessitates
"a case-by-case analysis of each individual situation. '260 Apparently, how-
ever, the defendant need not be totally destitute. Ownership of a seven-
year-old "ordinary horse" in addition to a homestead and a car that was not
running did not disqualify a defendant from having a free record on appeal
that cost between $250 and $300.2,1 But a claim of mere inability to "get
to" assets will be insufficient to establish indigency. 262
255. Due process requires that the prosecutor honor his bargains or make bargains
that he can keep. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
256. Curtis v. State, 500 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
257. 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
258. See, e.g., Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974); MacKenna v. Ellis,
280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
259. 513 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
260. Stephens v. State, 509 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The trial
court is required to appoint counsel for "an accused charged with a felony or a misde-
meanor punishable by imprisonment [who] is too poor to employ counsel." TEX. CODE
CUM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(a) ('1966). The trial court has a duty to conduct an in-
quiry at any time during the proceedings that a question arises concerning the financial
status of the accused. Foley v. State, 514 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
261. Stephens v. State, 509 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
262. Butler v. State, 506 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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VI. TRIAL
Jury Trial.263  The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana264 held that
systematic exclusion of women from jury service was unconstitutional, but re-
emphasized that any particular jury actually chosen need not "mirror the
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. '265
In line with that notion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
the mere showing that an identifiable group is not represented on a jury will
not in itself establish discrimination. 266 When a defendant objects to the ex-
clusion of a qualified juror or the inclusion of an allegedly disqualified juror,
he must show that he was injured or forced to proceed with an objectionable
juror 26 7 in order to establish error on appeal.
A concern that voir dire examination in jury selection may unduly prolong
the criminal proceeding is reflected in several cases in which the trial court's
decision to limit questioning was upheld. In Smith v. State the court held
that the trial judge could properly prohibit duplicitous questioning and could
impose reasonable limits on the amount of time for questioning. 268  In
Barrett v. State269 the trial court's limitation of voir dire examination for each
side to thirty minutes was not considered an abuse of discretion, particularly
when the complaining counsel had not demonstrated any specific need for
additional questioning. Because of the push for streamlining and speeding
up the criminal process, the wide latitude traditionally given counsel in voir
dire may be limited severely.
Appearance of Defendant and Witnesses. The compelled appearance of a
defendant in either a jail uniform or physical restraints compromises the pre-
sumption of innocence and is reversible error "unless the record reflects a
good and sufficient reason for pursuing such an extraordinary course. '270
According to Thompson v. State2 71 the propriety of requiring defense witnes-
ses to appear in uniforms or handcuffs is measured by the same standard as
that which applies to the defendant, namely, abuse of discretion. In either
case, if an objection is made the trial judge should give his reasons for allow-
ing such an appearance and should instruct the jury not to consider the re-
straint in assessing the proof and determining guilt.2 7 2  In Thompson the
263. The United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee of
right to a trial by jury for non-petty offenses applied to contempt offenses whenever pun-
ishable by more than six months. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Codispoti
v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
264. 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975).
265. Id. at 702, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
266. Ford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Moya v. State, 508
S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); cf. 'Partida v. State, 506 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974) (allegation of grand jury discrimination).
267. Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
268. 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In Burkett v. State, 516 S.W.2d 147
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the failure of counsel to present the whole of the voir dire
examination did not preserve his claimed error of unreasonable limitation of voir dire
because the court could not determine whether the questions were duplicitous or not.
269. 5,16 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
270. Walthall v. State, 505 S.W.2d 8918, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
271. 5,14 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
272. Id. at 278.
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court found no abuse of discretion where the trial court had allowed the
defense witness to appear in handcuffs and jail clothes. Detailed reasons
were given by the judge in support of his conclusion that it was necessary
to preserve order in the courtroom. 273 The merger of the question of jail
uniforms with that of physical restraints appears questionable in light of the
Fifth Circuit case of Williams v. Estelle.27 4  The court there held that trial
of a defendant in his jail uniform is inherently unfair because, unlike physical
restraints, trial in uniform is unnecessary and does not serve any legitimate
state interest.2 75 According to the Fifth Circuit's rationale, appearance of
the defendant or a defense witness in jail uniform is presumptively error and
could not be justified by considerations relating to preservation of order.
Furthermore, waiver will not be inferred from mere failure to object if the
objections would have been futile because trial in prison garb was customary
in that jurisdiction. However, if evidence exists that the defendant desired
to wear the uniform for tactical reasons, he may be held to have waived any
objections to unfairness.
Confrontation. The court considered several cases of claimed sixth amend-
ment violations where the confession of another person was admitted as evi-
dence against the defendant. The general rule is that a confession of guilt
is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule only against its maker. Of
course, in a joint trial based on a conspiracy theory, the out-of-court state-
ments of one defendant during the existence of the conspiracy may be
admitted against a co-conspirator to prove the existence of a conspiracy.276
However, in the trial of a single defendant the admission of another's con-
fession could be a violation of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. 277
Ex parte Smith278 is a typical case. In the defendant's trial for murder
with malice, the state introduced the confession of Coverson, who did
not testify at the trial. Coverson's written confession implicated Smith as be-
ing among the group that went to the residence of the victim on the night
he was killed by a member of the group. The court found the admission
of Coverson's statement violative of the defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation and cross-examination, but held that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily because of defendant's own admissible
confession.279
Circumstantial Evidence. The failure to give a requested jury charge on cir-
cumstantial evidence is error when no evidence is presented at trial that con-
stitutes direct evidence of the ultimate fact to be proved. Hence, where the
only proof of heroin possession is the defendant's presence in a residence at
273. Id. The reasons given by the judge all related to the potential dangerousness
of the witnesses and to the necessity of maintaining order. Quaere how a jail uniform
contributes to preservation of order?
274. 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
275. Id. at 209.
276. See Anderson v. United States, 417 ,U.S. 211 (1974).
277. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
278. 513 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
279. Id. at 846. See also Carver v. State, 510 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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the time heroin was discovered and a recent puncture mark on his arm, a
circumstantial evidence charge should have been given. 280  Similarly, failure
to give such a charge resulted in the reversal of a murder conviction in Eiland
v. State.2181  Defendant's fingerprints on the window and windowsill of the
victim's bedroom were not direct evidence of his guilt even though they
could have been, for example, in a burglary prosecution where illegal entry
is the primary fact to be proved. 282  In Grandison v. State283 the absence
of any evidence that the defendant had been alone with the alleged murder
victim made the failure to give a requested circumstantial evidence charge
reversible error.
The requirement of giving a circumstantial evidence charge is qualified by
the so-called "close juxtaposition" doctrine, the application of which has
caused a split among the members of the Texas court. Closely akin to the
concept of harmless error, the doctrine obviates the need of a circumstantial
evidence charge in cases in which the evidence is "in such close relation to
the main fact to be proved as to constitute [or have the same effect as] direct
evidence. ' 284 The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence
is -tenuous and often -the weight of circumstantial evidence is as persuasive
as "direct" evidence. For example, in Logan v. State285 the defendant was
convicted of possession of heroin on the basis of a series of closely related
facts. Evidence was introduced that the defendant was seen with a burned
spoon and syringe. ,He hid in a closet from which an apparently similar
burned spoon and syringe containing heroin were recovered, made a state-
ment refering to "stuff" being in a bedroom in which heroin was found, and
jumped bond before the case was tried. Although the majority opinion states
that the evidence was direct, it also concluded that "the facts stated are in
such close juxtaposition to each other as to eliminate the necessity of giving
a charge on circumstantial evidence. '2 86 Logan could be read as supporting
a proposition that whether the evidence is characterized as direct or closely
related circumstantial evidence, if it excludes any reasonable hypothesis of
innocence, a charge on circumstantial evidence is not required. 287 The
court's reluctance to make an artificial distinction between the quality of
direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence is further reflected in Taylor v.
State.288 Despite Judge Onion's dissent where he stated that the majority
unnecessarily overturned well-settled law,289 the court held that lack of con-
sent by the victim in burglary and theft cases may be shown by circumstantial
280. Crawford v. State, 502 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. .1973). See also Selman
v. State, 505 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
281. 509 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
282. Id. at 598. To be distinguished are cases in which the accused admits that he
killed the deceased, in which case a circumstantial evidence instruction is not required.
Sloan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
283. 514 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. '1974).
284. Roberts v. State, 489 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
285. 510 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
286. Id. at 600.
287. Cf. Draper v. State, 513 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
288. 508 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
289. Id. at 398.
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evidence regardless of the availability of direct evidence.290
Extraneous Offenses. The extraneous offense exception to the basic prin-
ciple that a defendant is to be tried solely on the charge of which he is ac-
cused is a valuable weapon frequently used by prosecutors. Despite the
court's efforts to clarify the scope of the exception, it remains, according to
one judge, "a jumbled mess, totally lacking in consistency and predictabil-
ity."291 Although "[e]ach case must be determined on its own merits, 2292
extraneous offenses are generally admissible as part of the res gestae of the
offense charged, or to show identity, intent, motive, scienter, or malice, or
to refute a defensive theory of the case. 293 However, the state may not use
collateral offenses to establish an issue for which it has uncontradicted direct
evidence because of the danger that the evidence admitted for a limited pur-
pose will be used to convict the defendant for bad character generally. 294
In Lolmaugh v. State295 the defendant discovered that his wife and her
father had gone out in the country for a clandestine sexual encounter, and
as a result he killed the father. The state attempted to rebut the defendant's
claim of self-defense by introducing part of his statement that he had pre-
viously shot a man who had been his wife's lover. All members of the court
agreed that admission of the statement was proper as tending "to show his
state of mind toward a class, lovers of his wife" and "to rebut his theory of
self-defense. ' 296 However, the court has split on application of the extrane-
ous offense exception in a number of cases.
In Ransom v. State297 defendant's identity as the perpetrator of a robbery
which took place on January 29 was the main issue at trial. Perhaps to
soften the impact of an anticipated introduction by the state of an extraneous
robbery offense committed several days before the robbery in question, de-
fense counsel offered evidence of the defendant's whereabouts on January
25. The state countered by producing rebuttal testimony that the defendant
had committed a robbery on January 25 and the trial court instructed the
jury to consider that evidence only on the issues of identity and intent. On
appeal a majority of the court upheld the state's rebuttal evidence. Two
members of the court affirmed on the gound that it was an extraneous offense
admissible to prove identity;298 a third judge stated that by raising the ques-
tion of alibi on January 25, the defendant had opened the door to the state's
rebuttal of that alibi.299 The two dissenting judges concluded that the ma-
jority had destroyed the effect of its previous decisions that had established
the requirement of common characteristics between the extraneous and pri-
290. Id. at 397.
291. Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
292. Lombardo v. State, 503 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
293. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W,2d 97, 100-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
294. Id. at 101.
295. 514 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
296. Id. at 759.
297. 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
298. Id. at 814.
299. Id. (Morrison, J., concurring).
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mary offenses when the extraneous offense was used to show identity.3 00
Although the modus operandi of each offense was clearly different, the
majority found the robberies sufficiently similar because both were committed
at gunpoint in Dallas by a perpetrator who was aided by a confederate. The
dissenters also objected to the broad language of the majority that any
extraneous offenses "which 'tend' to defeat or discredit the accused's defen-
sive theory" are admissible to rebut an alibi. Apparently, their fear was that
the state would now be free to use any uncharged offense to impeach the
defendant generally rather than to show merely the unbelieveability of his
claim of alibi.
In Kirkpatrick v. State3 ' the court divided on the question of whether
failure to give the ordinarily required limiting charge to the jury on extrane-
ous offenses was error. The defendant, a justice of the peace, was convicted
of conversion on evidence that he had collected fines amounting to over
$1500 and that only part of that amount was transmitted to the county treas-
urer. By a 3-2 vote the court held that a requested charge limiting the jury's
consideration of all the ancillary transactions to the questions of identity, in-
tent, motive and scheme was not required. The majority stated that the
transactions were not extraneous but all part of the chain of events showing
the ultimate conversion. 30 2 The dissenters took the position that because
there were at least two hundred technically separate offenses submitted to
the jury it could return a conviction if it found him guilty of any one of
them.3 03
Jury Argument. Defense counsel who deplore the judicial tendency to afford
the prosecutor wide latitude in jury argument will find little solace in the deci-
sions of the past year. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo30 4 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the First Circuit that a prosecutor's
argument had denied due process to a defendant convicted of first degree
murder in the state court.305 In reference to the defendant's motives for
standing trial the prosecutor had stated, "I quite think that they [the
defendant and his counsel] hope that you find him guilty of something a little
less than first-degree murder." The lower court found this statement to be
a deliberate attempt to convey the false impression that the defendant had
unsuccessfully tried to plead guilty to a lesser charge. Although disclaiming
any intent to justify prosecutorial misconduct, the Supreme Court stated that
''a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous
remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury. . . will draw that
meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. ' 30 6  This
appears to be nothing less than a statement of a presumption that a jury has
300. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
301. 5:15 S.W.2d 289 ,(Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
302. Id. at 292.
303. Id. at 294 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
304. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
305. DeChristoforo v. Donnelly, 473 F.2d 1236 (1st Cir. 1973) (habeas corpus pro-
ceeding).
306. 416 U.S. at 647.
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drawn the least harmful of inferences possible from a prosecutor's comments.
As such, it is an affirmation of what might be called the "necessary implica-
tion" standard of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.3 07 Accordingly, in
any case in which conflicting inferences may be drawn, the defendant bears
the stringent burden of establishing on the basis of the whole proceedings and
argument that the improper inference was drawn. Moreover, even if the
reviewing court finds that such an inference was drawn, it still may hold that
the error was harmless because any prejudice from the statement could not
have had any determinative effect on the outcome of the trial.
The greatest obstacle to obtaining reversals based on improper argument
by the prosecutor is the concept of waiver. The defendant will be held to
have waived any objection to anything other than fundamentally unfair argu-
ment that goes outside the record under the "open door" or "invited argu-
ment" doctrine if it is found to have been made merely in response or retalia-
tion to remarks of the defense that also go outside the record. 08  Further-
more, to preserve error the defendant must specifically object to the prose-
cutor's comment, request an instruction that the jury disregard it, move for
a mistrial, and obtain a ruling on each objection and request. In addition,
he must except to a denial of his mistrial motion.30 9
VII. SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS
In Adrighetti v. State310 the court held that prior misdemeanor convictions,
although obtained when the defendant was neither represented by counsel
nor when he had waived his right to counsel may be used for impeachment
or to enhance punishment if the prior conviction did not result in imprison-
ment.311 In perhaps one of the most significant decisions of the past year,
the court held in Scamardo v. State312 that the state's burden of proof in pro-
bation revocation proceedings was a preponderance of the evidence.
Current cases relating to the state's treatment of persons committed to
mental institutions, such as the Fifth Circuit case of Donaldson v. O'Con-
nor, 313 could have a significant impact on future correctional treatment of
criminal offenders. Although in Donaldson it was a civilly committed plain-
tiff who was held to have a constitutional right to treatment, the court's
rationale could logically extend to support the same right in persons commit-
ted under the criminal process.3 14 -In fact, dissimilar treatment and release
307. See, e.g., Winkle v. State, 506 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
308. See, e.g., Gleffe v. State, 509 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jordan v.
State, 500 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
309. See, e.g., Sloan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). See generally
Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument, 28 Sw. L.J. 505, 535-
40 (1974).
310. 507 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
311. Id. In dissent, Judge Onion said "color me amazed." Id. at 775.
312. 517 S.W.2d 29-3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). For an excellent discussion of the
unique nature of probation revocation proceedings in Texas see Comment, Scarpelli A
Mandate for Change of the Due Process of Law Requirements in Texas Probation Revo-
cation Hearings, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 895 (1974).
3,13. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 894 (1974) (No. 74-8).
314. This fact was noted by Chief Justice Burger during the oral argument of the
case before the United States Supreme Court. See 16 Cim. L. RaP. 4154, 4156 (1975)
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procedures of criminally committed mental patients vis-A-vis those who had
been civilly committed were held unconstitutional by a Texas federal district
judge in Reynolds v. Neill.3 15 A general constitutional principle that emerges
from these cases is that the state has an obligation to provide that degree
of correctional treatment which corresponds to the need for treatment which
was claimed to justify the confinement in the first instance. A case support-
ing this proposition is Morales v. Turman,316 in which a Texas federal judge
ordered a comprehensive reorganization and revamping of two juvenile treat-
ment facilities under the auspices of the Texas Youth Council.
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Relatively few appeals involving convictions under the new Penal Code
have as yet been decided, but the Code promises to be a fertile source of
appellate litigation in future years. Recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court concerning the constitutionally-required specificity of penal
statutes 17 have encouraged an increasing number of attacks on the definition
of offenses in Texas. A majority of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
voted to reconsider its decision on original submission concerning the Texas
obscenity statute in West v. State.318  Initially the court had decided that the
terms "sexual matters" in the old statute, and "sex, nudity or excretion" in
the new section 43.21319 were sufficiently specific on their face to withstand
a challenge of vagueness and overbreadth.3 20  However, the majority decided
on rehearing that the wiser course was to uphold the obscenity statute by find-
ing an authoritative construction of potentially obscene matter in prior Texas
case law. In several other cases the court had little trouble finding that statu-
tory language was clear and precise enough to give a person of ordinary intel-
ligence fair notice that his- contemplated conduct is forbidden and to prevent
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. 321
An issue dividing the court in several different types of cases was the suf-
ficiency of evidence presented to require charges by the trial court on a lesser
included offense. In Thompson v. State,3 22 involving a prosecution for
assault with intent to murder a police officer, the court held that the failure
to give defendant's specifically requested charge on the lesser included
offense of aggravated assault was reversible error. The majority concluded
for portions of that oral argument. Lack of money by the state would be no excuse.
See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring the Mississippi state
prison system to virtually overhaul itself).
315. 381 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
316. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
317. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974).
318. 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), aff'g on rehearing 489 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
319. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 43.21 (1974).
320. For criticism of the court's approach on original submission, see Bubany, The
Texas Penal Code of 1974, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 292, 333-35
(1974).
321. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 518 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); McMorris
v. State, 516 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
322. No. 48,074 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 30, 1974).
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that an aggravated assault charge was required in cases in which the evidence
indicated no intent to kill. The dissenting judges, however, thought that the
earlier cases did not support such a broad proposition because in those cases
the defendant did not rely solely on an accident theory, but presented evi-
dence of intent to use some force but not to kill. They stated that in the
case under consideration the defendant's theory of defense and his evidence
sought to prove only accident, that is, that in fact no assault occurred at all
because of a lack of intent even to injure the victim. In Esparza v. State323
the majority found that in a murder prosecution a charge on negligent
homicide was required in addition to the charge on accident that was given
because the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding of the lesser included
offense. Unlike its approach in Thompson, the court refused to adopt a gen-
eral statement from previous cases as a rigid rule, namely, that a charge of
negligent homicide is not required when a proper charge on accident is given.
Thus, because there was evidence that the defendant swung his baby around
in an attempt to make it dizzy so it would go to sleep, the jury could find
that an intentional act produced an unintended result, a finding consis-
tent with negligent homicide, but not with murder or accident.
The court has also held that in prosecutions for either murder or assault
with intent to murder with malice, a charge on the lesser offenses of murder
or assault without malice should be given when the evidence shows imme-
diate acts of the victim which aroused passion in the defendant. 324 The fail-
ure to instruct on the lesser offense will be required even if the defendant
denies an intent to kill, which is an element of passion killings or assaults. 325
Convictions for possession of proscribed drugs have been a source of
numerous appeals attacking both the sufficiency of the evidence and the ade-
quacy of jury charges. To prove a possession charge, the state must show:
"(1) that the accused exercised actual care, control and management over
the [contraband], and (2) that he knew that the object he possessed was
contraband. '13 2  Hence, in Troyer v. State327 the trial court's failure to
charge the jury that to convict it must find knowing possession resulted in
reversal. In a number of cases, the court reversed convictions for possession
of prohibited drugs because of insufficient evidence of possession. 328  Proof
of mere presence at a place where narcotics are being used which are not
within the exclusive possession of the accused is insufficient without proof
of other facts that affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Close
proximity could be a factor indicating knowledge.32 9  However, the af-
firmative link was not established in a case where contraband was found
323. 520 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
324. Ray v. State, 515 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Armentrout v. State, 515
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Mays v. State, 513 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974).
325. Ray v. State, 515 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
326. See, e.g., Higgins v. State, 515 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Wool-
ridge v. State, 514 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
327. 516 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
328. See, e.g., Higgins v. State, 515 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Woolridge
v. State, 514 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
329. See generally Higgins v. State, 515 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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in a borrowed automobile occupied by the defendant. 33 0 Although the con-
traband was in close proximity to the defendant, it was not in plain view since
it was discovered only upon a third inspection of the automobile. Further-
more, no odor was emitted which could have made the defendant aware of
the contraband, and there was no indication that the defendant had access
to the area in which it was found.
330. Woolridge v. State, 514 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
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